Chapter 13: Foreign Relations--
Living in the World

Chapter Objectives

When you have finished reading this chapter you should understand:

1. Why American government cannot be studied in isolation from the world environment.

2. Why the paradigm in terms of which most people think about foreign relations is inadequate both as a description of the way things presently are and as a prescription of how things ought to be.

3. How American involvement in world affairs has changed over the years, and why the growing importance of foreign relations has increased presidential leverage at the expense of Congress.

4. The logic of the "balance of terror" by which the U.S. has tried to deter other countries from an atomic attack that it lacks the power to prevent.

5. Why unilateral disarmament does not make sense under present world conditions, and how a world government might create conditions in which national disarmament is a rational action.

6. How military conscription conflicts with basic American values, and why it makes victory in long but limited wars very hard to achieve in a democracy.

7. How the powers of purse and pen also are involved in American foreign relations, but in less dramatic ways than the power of the sword.

8. What a multinational corporation (MNC) is, why they are increasingly important, and why effective regulation of them by national governments is probably impossible.

9. Why democracies have particular problems in conducting successful foreign relations, and why a fully democratic government under which individual liberty is maximized would have to be a universal one.

Key Terms

ABC weapons
deterrence
NOSTAC
commander-in-chief
Fabianism
OPEC
conscription
involuntary servitude
psychological Pearl Harbor
detente
multinational corporation
second strike capacity
rationality of irrationality

Finally, as we are unable to conceive upon what theory the exaction by government from the citizen of the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation, as the result of a war declared by the great representative body of the people, can be said to be the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that the contention to that effect is refuted by its mere statement. *

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN THE WORLD

Circumstances within which they exist and act are as important for nations as they are for individuals. American involvement in foreign affairs has constantly deepened as natural barriers formerly isolating us from the rest of the world have been destroyed by advancing technology. It has become increasingly difficult to understand American government without knowing something about the rest of the world.

Weapons

Perhaps the most dramatic modern developments have been the so- called ABC weapons--atomic, biological, and chemical. Atomic and hydrogen bombs are now deployed in Europe and in underground or underwater systems capable of delivering them anywhere on earth. These bombs are being produced by more and more governments, and it may not be long before some are wielded by nonstate actors (NOSTACS), [Footnote 1] such as international terrorist groups.

Biological and chemical weapons could be more devastating even than atomic ones. Entire populations might be wiped out by a synthesized virus against which other populations were inoculated. Nor can we be sure that ethical scruples will prevent all people with such weapons from actually using them. Since the 1960s private attacks against airliners, trains, buildings full of people, and even schools have become all too common. In every American airport one must pass through electronic detectors before boarding a flight; foreign airports are not always this thorough, with predictable results. The 1972 Olympic Games, designed to embody principles of peace and cooperation, became the stage for political violence when Israeli athletes were slaughtered by Arab terrorists. High level American diplomats and corporate managers are now routinely assigned teams of bodyguards in many parts of the world.

Although the sword is the dramatic element of world politics, the purse is also important. Industrialized economies require so many natural resources that few countries can be self- sufficient. Increasing interdependency, especially obvious in the case of oil, makes isolationist policies ever more impossible.

The pen, of course, is also important in world affairs. Turn on a short wave radio receiver in the early morning, late afternoon, or evening and you cannot but be impressed with the variety of propaganda bouncing off the ionosphere from one country to another: the Voice of America, Radio Moscow, the BBC, Radio Havana, all beamed at target countries in appropriate languages.

Knowledge of the World

In spite of many sources of information about world affairs, most Americans are quite ignorant about the world. Knowledge of geography tends to be particularly vague. Who, prior to 1964, knew where Vietnam is? Even today, how many people in the United States can name the capital of Canada? One survey of high school students found that 40% thought that Israel was an Arab country.

Americans also have limited knowledge of foreign languages compared with their educational peers in Europe. Some high school students study Spanish, French, and German, but very few people study such vital languages as Russian, Arabic, or Chinese.

The nastiness of international relations discourages many people from thinking about them. Many seek comfort in platitudes ("Freedom is good"), or in wishful thinking ("The Russians are mellowing"). E. E. Schnattschneider once observed that "Government is like an oyster, hard on the outside and soft on the inside." [Footnote 2] Domestic politics--the soft inside of the oyster--can be nasty enough. International relations, the hard outside of government, are often outrageously so. Among nations the ultimate recourse is war-- mass imposition of sanctions on government and people of other countries. Conflicts of the same type and magnitude within a country are resolved, instead, in the courts. In the realm of the purse, horrible economic inequalities can be found from country to country. And in terms of the pen, lies and propaganda and hatred permeate the world media.

The Paradigm We Hold of the World. One final discouragement: the prevailing paradigm in terms of which we think about foreign affairs is even more inadequate than that for thinking about domestic affairs. This paradigm sees a world of self- sufficient, independent, and equal nation-states dealing via diplomats with one another and only with one another. It makes no allowance for interdependency and inequality between countries. Worse, it makes no allowance for the growing importance of the NOSTACS (nonstate actors) such as multinational corporations, unions, churches, cartels, terrorists, and intergovernmental organizations such as NATO, the Common Market, the U.N., and W.H.O. Worst of all, the paradigm includes a normative element implying that, to the extent that actual events diverge from its concepts, so much the worse for events. Of course, value judgments are inevitable in politics and in political analysis. But this particular value judgment--that the world should be a collection of equal and independent nation-states--is doubly perverse. It holds up as ideal a system that in fact has few attractive qualities, and it prevents evidence that things are not as described by the paradigm from leading to the demise and replacement of that paradigm with a more adequate one.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Historical Development

The birth of the United States was intimately connected with international relations. During the century and a half after 1620, eastern North America was settled by a motley crew of political and religious dissidents, ambitious people stifled by class-bound European societies, "transported" criminals, and slaves. Native Americans, occasionally recognized as sovereign nations, were generally shoved aside by the land-hungry Europeans.

The Indians helped create the diplomatic scenario within which the United States became independent. During the Seven Years War (1756-1763) the French government encouraged Indians to fight the British settlers in America. On this side of the Atlantic the Seven Years War was known as the French and Indian War. England "won," but its victory ironically stimulated the American revolution. Taxes slapped on Americans to help pay for the war and subsequent defense were bitterly resented, and the Americans received considerable foreign aid from the revenge- seeking French king during the War of Independence. Without encouragement from Paris, we might have accepted a compromise settlement and remained a part of England. Footnote 3

During the first century of our independence American foreign policy was characterized by caution and expansion. President Washington's parting advice to avoid foreign entanglements was generally heeded, though there was a limited involvement towards the end of the Napoleonic wars (the War of 1812) when the British sacked Washington, D.C., and destroyed the White House. Diplomats were largely concerned with acquiring additional land- -the Louisiana Purchase, 1803, acquisition of Florida, 1819, the annexation of Texas, 1845, the Oregon territory, 1846, the southwest, 1848 and 1853, and the Alaskan purchase, 1867. The Civil War, to all appearances an entirely domestic crisis, actually involved serious diplomatic problems. Special efforts were made to fend off foreign recognition of the Confederacy as an independent country and to minimize sales of foreign arms to the rebels.

During our first century, American investments abroad were greatly outweighed by foreign investments here. Until the Civil War, most federal revenue came from the tariff on imported goods, and tariffs still accounted for about half of all receipts until World War I disrupted trade and increased government expenditures.

Our first massive foreign involvement came in the concluding years of World War I. President Woodrow Wilson brought the United States into the war to break the stalemate among the principal parties. The wisdom of American involvement was debatable. Stalemated, the Europeans might have negotiated an equitable end to the war. After U.S. intervention produced a decisive victory over the Germans and Austrians, the unfortunate Versailles Peace Conference imposed terms on Germany that made the second world war almost inevitable. [Footnote 4] The wisdom and restraint producing a century of relative peace after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 were conspicuously absent from Versailles. In any event the war signaled American emergence as a world military power. Economically, the war was also a turning point. Since 1919 the U.S. has consistently had more investments abroad than foreigners have had in the United States. And tariffs, which except during the Civil War had never been much less than half of total federal revenues, have never since amounted to more than one sixth of those revenues. By the 1976 Bicentennial year, tariffs provided less than 2% of federal receipts.

After a period of retrenchment, American entry to world politics was massively confirmed in World War II. By 1945 more than 12 million Americans were in uniform. The final scenes of that war saw the unleashing of atomic power against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Thus, in 1945, a war ended and a new age dawned.

The world situation since 1945 has been extremely dynamic and confusing. Sorting out developments is difficult. Against a backdrop of technological revolution (transistors, computers, jet aircraft, space travel, antibiotics, synthetic fibers, and so forth) a multitude of political developments have occurred: the United Nations and all connected associations; Communist imperialism, itself spawned in the disruptions of World War I, but greatly strengthened by World War II; the break-up of the west European colonial empires; the Korean and Vietnam wars; on again/off again hostilities in the Middle East; detente; the energy crisis and the rise of OPEC (the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries). And the terrorists--the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the Irish Republican Army, Black September, the Vietcong.

Organizational Development

As we have already seen, the president has special leverage and responsibilities over the conduct of American foreign relations. His constitutional designation as commander-in-chief and as head of state (sending and receiving diplomats, negotiating treaties) is reinforced by the necessity of speed and secrecy in successful diplomacy and war. These are attributes of individuals or of administrative hierarchies, not of committees and legislatures. Historically, presidential powers have expanded during times of war and international tension. The Civil War, World Wars I and II, and Korea each saw new powers assumed by or heaped upon the president. Reactions to the unsuccessful Vietnam involvement, however, may have reversed this trend for the time being.

Role of the President. Expanded presidential powers in the area of foreign affairs have important implications. The hand on the "button" that can devastate the entire planet has grave responsibilities. Presidents must have a stable personality and be slow to panic or to anger. There is also a danger that a president can exploit his foreign affairs powers for domestic political purposes, arranging crisis or grand tours to increase his chances for reelection.

Presidential powers in foreign affairs are now so immense that they cannot be wielded by one man. As with domestic powers, they have become embodied in organizations--principally the departments of State and Defense, the CIA, and the National Security Council and its staff.

These organizations have all the advantages and weaknesses of organizations in general. The presidents cannot assume that these agencies will do what he wants. Before becoming President Nixon's chief foreign policy advisor, Dr. Henry Kissinger noted the conservative and unimaginative tendencies of organizations responsible for foreign policy. [Footnote5] Nixon's initiatives were often complete surprises to the State Department. Only after a highly symbolic presidential visit to Peking could the State Department overcome 20 years of avoiding overt contacts with so-called Red China (the People's Republic of China). If Nixon had just sat in the Oval Office and ordered the State Department to develop better relations with Peking, in all likelihood nothing would have happened. The same considerations may have inspired Egyptian President Sadat's dramatic visit to Israel in 1977. The organizational weapon is blunt abroad as well as at home. Presidents must either limit themselves to choosing among available standard operating procedures, or they must go around their organizations and force them to fall in line afterwards.

The Role of Congress. The role of Congress and the courts in foreign affairs is distinctly subordinate to that of the executive branch. Congress can do very little leading, but it can be a powerful restraint on what presidents can do. Congress can criticize, it can investigate, and most important of all, it can refuse to appropriate money for schemes or organizations it opposes. And the Senate can refuse to ratify treaties. But these are negative powers, not the power to conduct foreign policy.

The Role of the Court. Judicial influence on American foreign policy has been weak and indirect. Since the world environment is basically lawless, foreign policy decisions have little to do with law. Even when American laws or the Constitution appear to speak to an issue, the courts have been reluctant to stop a president from doing what he wishes in foreign affairs, especially if Congress is cooperating with him. The Supreme Court did make President Harry Truman give back control of the steel mills he had seized during the Korean War to their private owners; but an earlier Court had refused to stop Franklin D Roosevelt from forcing thousands of Japanese-Americans into "relocation camps" during World War II, even though the action obviously was based on a suspect classification according to race. [Footnote 6] A later Court refused to order a withdrawal from Vietnam even though Congress had never declared war. In light of continued appropriations of money to fight the war, it would have required considerable judicial imagination to argue that Congress opposed the Vietnam operations.

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POWER OF THE SWORD

The power of the sword appears more nakedly in foreign affairs than in any other branch of politics. Even if "all political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," as Mao Tse-tung maintained, that gun is not always openly brandished in domestic politics. It is available when needed, but most political life inside a stable country is in contemplation of the gun rather than literally at its barrel. At the world level, politics is more overtly nasty; use of armed force is routinely and openly threatened.

The president has particular control over the power of the sword. Of the 11 wars the U.S. has fought since 1789, only five have been formally declared by Congress; the other six, as well as scores of lesser military interventions, were fought under presidential authority alone.

       Declared Wars         Undeclared Wars
       _________________________________________________
       War of 1812           Naval war with France, 1798-1800
       Mexican-American War  Two wars with Barbary pirates
       Spanish-American War  Mexican-American conflict of 1914-1917
       World War I           Korean War
       World War II          Vietnam (World War III)

Foreign Affairs Conducted by the Sword

Since 1945 the United States and the Soviet Union have been engaged in an arms race and the space race. American development of atomic bombs during World War II left the rest of the world far behind in military technology. But the United States did not use its opportunity to destroy the Soviet dictatorship, as suggested by the philosopher Bertrand Russell in 1948. Russell wanted the U.S. to threaten the Russians with immediate war unless they agreed to refrain from producing atomic weapons. By the early 1950s the Soviet Union had its own atomic bombs, making Russell's advice impractical to follow. (Ultimately Russell became a pacifist.) There has been a continuous development of newer and more destructive atomic (as well as biological and chemical) weapons by the two superpowers.

The Space Race. Until 1957 Americans could take heart, believing yankee ingenuity would always lead the field and thus guarantee continued "superiority" over Russian military might. Except for an historical accident and, paradoxically, inferior Russian atomic technology, this smugness might have prevailed indefinitely. The "accident" was that the U.S. government placed a very low priority on developing artificial satellites and placing them in earth orbit. And fears of militarizing outer space, escalating the arms race, produced a decision that the American satellite should be orbited by a civilian agency. The U.S. military rockets that could easily have orbited a small satellite thus were not assigned this task until it was too late, at least psychologically. On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I, scoring one up on the U.S. and shocking the country out of its complacency. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg had been executed in the early 1950s for stealing U.S. atomic secrets, but it was hard to accuse the Soviets of stealing the ability to do what the U.S. had yet to accomplish.

Sputnik I was a "psychological Pearl Harbor." Reactions included efforts to revitalize physical science and mathematics classes, increased (but still miniscule) teaching of Russian, and an order to our military to launch a satellite immediately. This satellite was successfully put into orbit a few months after Sputnik I. However, American insecurity was compounded when the Russians proceeded to orbit the first human being early in 1961. An American did not follow him until nearly a year later--the Russian lead was growing.

Ironically, the Soviet Union's head start in manned space exploration was made possible by its atomic and electronic backwardness. Soviet engineers had failed to develop lightweight hydrogen bombs. Soviet military rockets were therefore designed to carry much larger payloads than contemporary American military rockets. The powerful Russian missiles were easily adapted for launching men, with their massive life-support systems, into space. The Russian lead lasted until American rockets designed expressly for manned travel could be developed, a process that inevitably took several years. The end result of this space race was the American moon landing in 1969.

The Arms Race. Atomic weapons are difficult if not impossible to defend against. Expensive antiballistic-missile missiles can be outwitted and outnumbered by cheap decoys. More esoteric defenses, such as laser beams that destroy an incoming bomb before it can explode, have presumably not been perfected. Civil defense against atomic weapons consists largely of hiding underground for protection against explosion and direct radiation, but can do little to prevent long term effects. Bentley Glass described the effects of a medium-sized attack on the U.S. in the following gory terms:

One cannot examine the consequences of nuclear war . . . and rest satisfied with an estimate of the immediate effects upon the human population. Man lives in a well-balanced environment, and the profound effects of a nuclear war upon the unsheltered and unshielded organisms that make up his ecological community dare not be forgotten. However adequate our shelters for people, there must remain outside them the animals we have domesticated, the plants we cultivate, the forests and the meadows, the soil, the birds, the insects, and the bacteria. . . .
The outside levels of radiation, in the event of a 10,000 MT attack on the United States, will obviously far exceed lethal limits for birds and mammals. Barring special measures for their protection, survivors will find no horses, cattle, pigs, chickens, or other animal sources of food remaining. Without the birds, the insects will take over. Since adult insects are in general very resistant to high- energy radiation, they will remain in large numbers wherever fire has not completely destroyed life. A cockroach, for example, can tolerate 400,000 r and many insects will tolerate 40,000 r or more. The larval forms are more sensitive and might be killed, were it not that many of them live and grow under water or under the bark of trees or in similar sheltered places. . . . The insects, unchecked in their ravages, may quickly destroy every green thing left by fire and blast.
The incendiary effects of nuclear weapons are increased by exploding them at high altitudes. According to one estimate, one 10 MT bomb could spread searing heat over 5,000 square miles, which is about the area of the state of Connecticut. The firestorms and lesser fires would hit countryside as well as cities, and depending upon the season of the year and the dryness of the vegetation, might burn off the land over vast stretches. What the fires left, the local fallout would probably kill, since a pine tree can stand only about 500 roentgens, and hardwood trees less than 1,000. Not only would they be destroyed, but unless somewhere seeds were preserved they could not be replanted. The erosion that would follow, on the unprotected soil, would be frightful to think. Footnote 7

Cold War Is a Balance of Terror. Lacking effective defenses against atomic attack, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have tried to achieve a "balance of terror." Rather than rendering the other government unable to destroy one's country, one tries to make it unwilling to do so. Deterrence requires that each country maintain a second strike capacity, the ability to destroy the attacking country after it has destroyed one's own. Since any surprise attack would presumably wipe out a high percentage of military bases, maintaining a second strike capacity requires more weapons and delivery systems than would be necessary to destroy the other country. One advantage to missile-launching submarines is that underwater craft are hard to locate. Hence, fewer submarines are needed to create an adequate second strike capability than surface ships or land- based missiles.

Credibility is a critical part of effective deterrence. One reason the French government developed its own atomic weapons was skepticism that the U.S. would honor commitments to defend France against Russian aggression. Would, indeed, the U.S. risk atomic retaliation on its own cities to bail out an ally?

Of course, the awesome weapon systems necessary to achieve deterrence present additional dangers. Some atomic, biological, or chemical genie may accidently escape from its bottle and refuse to go back in again when asked. While fail safe procedures for atomic weapons may be adequate, it is doubtful whether the same is true--or ever could be true--for biological and chemical weapons. Even getting rid of these weapons when they are no longer wanted has presented extreme technical difficulties. It also appears that a lone maniac might have greater chances of obtaining biological or chemical weapons.

Serious questions therefore arise as to the prudence of even experimenting with the BC weapons, let alone mass-producing them. However, the same consideration that prompts people who find atomic weapons abhorrent to manufacture may force countries to develop biological and chemical weapons. If no defenses are available against a biochemical attack, threats of a similar attack might at least deter an identifiable aggressor from initiating the use of such weapons. But what can be done about an attack from an unknown source?

The arms race graphically illustrates how circumstances affect what it is rational to do. ABC warfare would be even more horrifying than the conventional wars, quite correctly described as "hell." Yet what are a country's alternatives in a world where other countries may have a strong interest in not matching their self-restraint? The paradox of unilateral (one-sided) disarmament is that it would weaken precisely those countries with the best sense of responsibility and the highest ideals. The western democracies' relative weakness short of total disarmament prior to World War 11 strongly disadvantaged them in dealing with the German Nazis. An alliance with the equally totalitarian, but less aggressive, Soviet Union was necessary to save the day, and the costs of that alliance are reflected in the present map of Europe.[ Footnote 8] As long as some nations are free to arm themselves, all nations unwilling to rely on some other country's protection must do likewise. This is too bad, if only because of the constructive uses to which the several hundred billion dollars, spent on armaments each year by various governments, could be put.

How Can We End a Cold War? To say that present circumstances require nations to arm themselves is not to endorse the status quo. Approaches might be developed that are as good as current methods defensively but less threatening to one's neighbors offensively. Rather than maintaining large standing ground forces, for example, the United States might shift to guerrilla defense of national territory--preparing everybody in the country to resist an invasion if necessary--coupled with strong naval and air forces to maintain atomic deterrence. Limited arrangements for self-restraint in development of new weapons systems--with inspection or other safeguards--may be worked out among the great powers, placing none at a disadvantage and saving money all around. We call such arrangements "detente." However, only limited gains can be achieved in this way, and it is no cure for the overall arms race problem.

Whenever we say that preparing to inflict outrageous devastation on other countries makes sense "under present circumstances," this is a sad reflection on those circumstances. Since tomorrow's circumstances are partially the result of today's actions, perhaps we should ask: Under what circumstances would disarmament at the national level constitute rational action? What can we do to help bring about such circumstances?

The Reciprocal Relationship between Technology and Warfare

It is obvious that technological developments can have dramatic impact on warfare. Inventions such as armor, gunpowder, and the radio have radically affected war. Technology, as we have seen, continues to have its impact on possible forms of war. Less widely understood are the contributions war has made to technology. Since war (in general) is usually regarded as bad, people may be reluctant to admit that some good things do grow out of it. Yet from wars and military preparations in the twentieth century alone have come antibiotics (on a mass scale), jet aircraft, rockets, radar, and atomic energy.

Military Conscription and Foreign Policy

There is one major exception to the generalization that people in state organizations are in a voluntary association with government. The sword has often been brandished against a government's own subjects to get them to participate in wielding it against foreigners.

The purpose of conscription is to raise military manpower quickly and cheaply. If the same number of people were to be induced--rather than inducted--to perform such unpleasant work, traditionally low pay would have to be increased. Rather than offering inducements sufficient to clear the market for soldiers, governments have therefore threatened those called up but refusing to serve with various sanctions ranging from imprisonment to death.

While the price of conscripted armies has been low, the total costs to society have been much higher. Indeed, the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force reported to Richard Nixon in 1970 that conscription costs more than an all-volunteer service when all of its intangible side effects are given due weight:

Although the budgetary expense of a volunteer armed force will be higher than for the present mixed force of volunteers and conscripts, the actual cost will be lower. This seemingly paradoxical statement is true because many of the costs of manning our armed forces today are hidden and are not reflected in the budget. Men who are forced to serve in the military at artificially low pay are actually paying a form of tax which subsidizes those in the society who do not serve. Furthermore, the output of the civilian economy is reduced because more men serve in the military than would be required for an all-volunteer force of the same strength. This cost does not show up in the budget. Neither does the loss in output resulting from the disruption in the lives of young men who do not serve, but who rearrange their lives in response to the possibility of being drafted. Taking these hidden and neglected costs into account, the actual cost to the nation of an all-volunteer force will be lower than the cost of the present force. Footnote 9

The Commission noted further, in a beautiful understatement, that the draft

has been a costly, inequitable, and divisive procedure for recruiting men for the armed forces. It has imposed heavy burdens on a small minority of young men while easing slightly the tax burden on the rest of us. It has introduced needless uncertainty into the lives of all our young men. It has burdened draft boards with painful decisions about who shall be compelled to serve and who shall be deferred. It has weakened the political fabric of our society and impaired the delicate web of shared values that alone enables a free society to exist. Footnote 10

As the Commission hinted delicately in its reference to "political fabric," one cost of conscription is that it renders democracy unable to fight protracted, limited wars. This is unfortunate. Limited but protracted wars may sometimes allow a country to avoid being boxed into a situation in which its only alternatives are total war or total capitulation.

President Johnson's approach to Vietnam was quite understandable. He plunged the U.S. into a limited war but tried to keep the monetary costs so low that few taxpayers would be offended. Unfortunately, this approach guaranteed that the Vietnam war would be lost. A Communist takeover of South Vietnam posed no direct and immediate threat to American security. This fact combined with the length of the war allowed an effective "antiwar" movement to develop. Although the movement's rhetoric was couched in terms of the war's immorality, the driving force behind it was undoubtedly fear of the draft.

The basic lesson we learned in Vietnam is dismal and rather frightening: Democracies are ill-equipped to fight and win limited wars, and totalitarian countries--in which dissidents can be rather summarily shot--therefore have a big advantage over us in this kind of war. We must wait until the threat is so obvious that the electorate can appreciate it and will support a war, financially or otherwise. Of course, there may be many advantages to slowness in going to war. Threats may dissolve of their own accord before the critical danger point is reached. Our potential enemies may even fight with each other while we sit back and watch, hoping that the radioactive fallout will blow the other way this week. But when an immediate threat does materialize, we may find that having our back to the wall is not always the best posture from which to fight.

Military conscription conflicts with fundamental American values. In a land placing high value on individual liberty and the rule of law, it arbitrarily deprives some individuals of much liberty. It is a prime manifestation of government-as-bandit, imposing sanctions not deduced from general rules of action. Those who argue that it is essential to the national welfare may be conceding that American ideals of "liberty and justice for all" are unattainable. At least, they are admitting that the circumstances within which we exist and act are deplorable, for only bad circumstances can justify actions that are intrinsically wrong.

The Place of War in Human Affairs

It is, unfortunately, quite untrue to say that force and violence never settle anything. Frequently, they settle who is going to go on living and who is not. They settle which government is going to have jurisdiction over a given area. And they settle who "owns" this or that, who has access to specific natural resources and who does not.

War is a way of deciding things that cannot be decided by other means at the time. The circumstances within which decisions must be made determine whether peaceful solutions can be achieved. The same disputes settled by wars or negotiations in contemplation of war between countries are settled by the courts when they arise between states in the U.S. In the U.S., conflict over ownership of a corner of Lake Erie produces a lawsuit between Ohio and Michigan; in the Middle East, conflict over the Gaza Strip produces wars between Egypt and Israel.

How We Could End Wars. If war is to be eliminated we must do one or more of the following things:

1. Arrange other methods of deciding the issues now settled by wars.

2. Arrange things so that certain kinds of decision no longer need be made.

3. Arrange things so that certain decisions are no longer regarded as important enough to fight over.

A world government, for example, could produce all three of these changes in the nature of boundary disputes. World courts would be available to settle boundary disputes authoritatively. If the world regime was a unitary rather than a federal one, no boundary decisions at all would have to be made, because there would be no boundaries. And under a federal arrangement, with recognized boundaries and the possibility of disputes over them, their importance would be attenuated by the fact that both parties would be subordinate to the world government. Although there was once a "war" between Ohio and Michigan over the disputed Toledo area, the actual hostilities were a farce and the episode is remembered chiefly because of its peculiarity. (Michigan won the war, so Ohio had to keep Toledo.)

War can be seen as a competition of the sword, just as markets express the competition of the purse. But while free markets encourage transactions in which prices tend towards a stable "equilibrium price," wars appear to be a destabilizing influence. In markets, the people best able to do things desired by other people prevail and flourish; in war, victory goes to those best able to do things not desired by others. In economic transactions, competition is almost universally regarded as good--according to Marx, a bad thing about capitalists is that they turn into monopolists who do not compete. In government--rooted in the sword-- monopoly is generally regarded as desirable except (somewhat inconsistently) at the world level. The fundamental social cooperation promoted by markets is somewhat reduced by strong conflict over how to divide up the benefits produced by that cooperation. But cooperation remains the dominant component of markets. Likewise, the social conflict expressed through wars is somewhat reduced by a mutual interest in reducing the bad consequences of that conflict, but the conflict remains predominant as long as independent governments continue to exist.

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE

Just as the president dominates the sword, so Congress has special leverage over the purse. Although sanctions are particularly conspicuous, inducements are also important in world politics. And the United States government cannot spend a dime that is not appropriated by Congress.

Through its purse, Congress can strongly influence uses to which government puts its sword and pen. If Congress refuses to appropriate the money, no swords can be purchased, and nobody can be hired (or conscripted) to wield the sword. While Congress cannot prevent the president and his top advisers from talking, it can prevent their messages from getting abroad by cutting appropriations for the Voice of America.

Treaties can only be ratified with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate. And if any money is to be paid out under the treaty, the House of Representatives must also consent. Conflict between House and Senate has sometimes arisen because the Senate can unilaterally consent to treaties committing the U.S. to spend money, thus placing the House under severe pressure to appropriate the money whether it approves of the deal or not.

Alliances as Voluntary Associations

Alliances are often public-voluntary associations. They are public because all of the parties are governments. They are voluntary if they result from mutual consent to the exchange or transfer of inducements. Enhanced ability, via cooperation, to impose sanctions on still other countries is, of course, an inducement.

Other alliances are brought together by threatened sanctions. When the U.S.S.R. sent in tanks after the Hungarians tried to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact in 1956, it made it impossible to maintain the fiction that the Pact was a voluntary association.

The relationship between dominant and dominated countries in such an alliance is similar to that between government and a drafted soldier. The dominated ally prefers to help the more powerful country fight against third parties rather than to fight its "ally." Perhaps it would be better off remaining neutral but, not being given this option, it tries to minimize the damage.

Examples of wartime alliances include those between the U.S., England, and the U.S.S.R. and between Germany, Italy, and Japan during World War II. In peacetime we find alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As in any voluntary association (assuming that these are such), there is much higgling and maneuvering to maximize benefits and minimize costs of participating, conflict over how to divide up the benefits of cooperation. Josef Stalin clearly suspected his World War II allies of close dealing when the U.S. and England kept postponing their target date for a full-fledged invasion of the European mainland. Americans tend to suspect that, exploited by our European NATO allies, we are shouldering more than our share of the costs of defending Western Europe.

Foreign Relations and the American Economy

Intricate international entanglements are developing between governments and private associations. Scarcities in natural resources drive governments and corporations to seek foreign opportunities. New technologies permitting large scale exploitation of seabed mineral resources raise international questions.

Natural Resources the World Needs. Oil, for example, is found both under the land and beneath the seas. Since oil deposits are not distributed proportionally to local demand, the governments of several oil-producing countries have great economic leverage growing out of their ability to turn the oil on and off. To be sure, OPEC, the cartel of petroleum exporting countries formed to try to force prices up, does not have unlimited power. As usual, if the price is forced too high it creates strong pressures for one or more cartel members to break ranks, lower prices, and capture larger shares of the market. OPEC has received credit (or blame) for price increases actually brought about by rapidly increasing world demand.

Since World War I, when the importance of oil first became evident, the U.S. has been concerned with maintaining adequate supplies. Attitudes toward oil imports have been rather ambivalent: desires for national self-sufficiency have conflicted with desires to preserve domestic reserves in case foreign supplies are cut off during a military emergency. Since World War II, an additional concern has been to keep the major Middle Eastern fields from falling under Communist control.

A major Soviet policy has been to encourage Arab anti- Americanism, expulsion of multinational oil companies, and refusal to sell oil to the U.S. A fruitful Soviet strategy has been to play on Arab animosities toward Israel. But only during and after the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 were the Arabs willing to accept the economic losses of boycotting sales to the U.S. Another important item of world trade is food. During the years of huge American surpluses produced by government price supports after World War II, much food was sold "for a song" or given away under various foreign aid programs. The principal purpose of these programs, as of their domestic equivalent--food stamps- -was to get rid of surplus food without depressing prices received by farmers. If this food had been put up for sale, supply-demand interactions would have driven prices down. But since the food was given to people who could not have bought it anyway, the aid programs did not reduce demand (in the economic sense) or depress prices.

Traditional American food surpluses can no longer be taken for granted. Acreage devoted to agriculture peaked around 1950 and has since declined steadily, as farms are gobbled up by highways, industries, and suburban sprawl. American farms consume huge amounts of energy, directly in operating machinery and indirectly via energy-intensive fertilizers and pesticides. Threats to the country's energy supply therefore also threaten its agricultural productivity.

Multinational Corporations

Inducements are wielded privately as well as governmentally. Giant multinational corporations pose issues for U.S. domestic and foreign policy and have immense implications for world affairs in general. These MNCs wield the power of the sword to a very limited extent only, defensively, in protecting top executives from terrorist attacks and kidnappings. But they do command great resources and wield a powerful purse and pen.

The biggest MNCs have annual sales greater than the gross national products of many of the smaller and poorer members of the United Nations. According to Pravda, official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, MNC output is growing at twice the rate of the rest of the noncommunist world economy. [Footnote 11] Pravda is not one to exaggerate the accomplishments of capitalists.

An MNC is not just a corporation selling part of its output in a foreign country. It maintains production facilities in more than one country. Indeed tariffs and other obstacles to free trade among countries have encouraged development of MNCS. A U.S. corporation unable to export its product to take advantage of sales opportunities in a foreign country often can achieve the same objective by starting a factory inside that country where restrictions against imports will not apply.

Another factor encouraging corporations to become multinational is the huge differentials in labor costs from country to country. Edward Higbee described how this advantage could operate in the computer industry:

[K]eypunching is the human bottleneck in computer systems. This human input adds greatly to the cost of computerized operations. The wages of keypunchers run about $500 a month [in 1970]. However, the Computer Input Corporation has developed a cut-rate solution. It has trained girls in Bangkok, Thailand, to keypunch American business data for $50 a month. Computer Input flies raw data from any American city, gets the cards punched in Bangkok, then flies them home across the Pacific to its clients-all within five days. It is very simple. The girls do not understand English-neither does the computer. Footnote 12

Complaints against MNCS. One of the principal complaints against the MNCs is that they have no loyalty to any country. They manipulate their operations, production locations, and accounting in order to minimize total corporate taxes or maximize total profits. They have sometimes bribed government officials to help in locating a plant or landing a lucrative contract. However, to say that MNCs have loyalty to no government is only a negative way of saying that they are not "parochial." Their leaders increasingly see the world as a whole rather than as a place inherently divided into many warring countries. They see petty nationalism as an obstacle to their own profitable operations, and they thus constitute a force tending to unify the world. Is this entirely bad?

Much of the bribery engaged in by MNCs is designed to induce foreign officials to refrain from interfering arbitrarily with their economic procedures. Probably the worst "sin" of the MNCS, aside from being private--calling down the enmity of doctrinaire socialists and communists--and big, is that they do not fit into the prevailing assumptions about how the world ought to be organized. Many recent textbooks on international relations still make almost no mention of MNCs or other NOSTACS. International relations are supposed to be entirely the province of governments. Governments are supposed to be the most important forces, so much so that for many people "history" automatically means history of government. Political leaders are supposed to be the most important and powerful people. Given these expectations it is completely presumptuous for MNCs to outproduce whole national economies, to deal directly with "foreign" governments, and (most impolite of all!) to pay top executives more than leaders of even the biggest governments get. Footnote 13

Like most people, Americans have mixed feelings about "foreign companies" operating in their midst. If Arabs were to put dollars earned by selling us oil in a mattress, howls of anger would reverberate across the U.S. "Balance of payments" problems would be denounced violently by one and all. But when Arab investors appear ready to purchase such American corporations as Pan Am or IBM, equal alarm is raised that the country is being bought up lock, stock, and barrel. (When Canadians raise the same objections to U.S. corporation activities there, Americans see this as petty parochialism, of course.)

Another charge hurled at the MNCs is that they "export jobs" by tilting their operations toward cheap labor countries. While this charge is strenuously denied by MNC spokesmen, it is undoubtedly true. The real question, however, is whether there is anything wrong with this practice. Workers in the job- exporting country, after all, are free to accept lower wages in order to compete more effectively for the MNC investment dollar. If, as Marx argued, the working man has no country, working men in general are made better off by the MNC efforts to minimize labor costs. These efforts move jobs from countries or parts of countries where people are better off to where they are worse off, and in the process provide opportunities for the less well off to improve their lot and narrow the gap. At the same time they permit production of goods at lower cost, which is reflected in consumer prices everywhere. Since everybody is a consumer, and real economic welfare depends as much on low price levels as on high wage levels, a strong argument can be made that MNCs are beneficial generally. Of course this does not mean that no one is ever harmed by their operations. Progress always has its victims.

MNCs and the Nations of the World. Relations between MNCs and countries are very complex. Since governments wield the sword, they can prevent any MNC from operating within their jurisdiction. Both IBM and Coca Cola, for example, left India in 1977 rather than comply with local regulations, and other companies have been kicked bodily out of various countries. On the other hand the MNCs have many options. They can use their purse and pen to destabilize a hostile regime. More important, they can simply set up shop in more congenial political climates. The advantages to having an MNC operate in one's country are so great that many countries cannot afford to repel them. This probably means that the MNCs are effectively uncontrollable under present world circumstances.

In the nineteenth-century U.S. a similar obstacle existed to effective state government regulation of national corporations. Because of the employment opportunities and tax revenues created by corporate operations, no state could afford to clamp down very hard. Really effective regulations might produce, not regulated corporations, but nothing. Such was competition among the states for the benefits of industry that American corporations remained largely unregulated until the national government became a regulator. Its rules applied nationwide, so there was no place in the country to which corporations could flee. Today, national efforts to regulate MNCs will probably be as futile as those of the states in the nineteenth century. But there is a critical difference between the two situations: in the nineteenth century a residual government was waiting in the wings-the U.S. government. There is no present world government available to play this part vis-a-vis the MNCS. The probable consequences of this fact are obvious.

Of course there is the United Nations. And the U.N. has been most interested in multinational corporations. Its pioneering report by an international "Group of Eminent Persons" was an excellent survey of the problems and opportunities posed by the MNCs and of various ideas about what to do about them. But the U.N. is not a government; it is a public-voluntary association and does not wield the sanctions that would be necessary to regulate MNCs effectively. (U.N. "sanctions" against countries like Rhodesia are not sanctions in the sense that would establish the involuntary association necessary to constitute a government. In our terms they are merely withdrawn inducements, a refusal to enter into voluntary associations with the "sanctioned" country.)

MNCs will therefore probably continue to be a factor in U.S. foreign relations indefinitely. They are, indeed, likely to last longer than many other aspects of the current world order.

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POWER OF THE PEN

Ideological Context of International Relations

According to Lord Keynes:

The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. . . . I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Footnote 14

As Keynes indicates, the pen may be the most powerful weapon over the long haul. In the short run sword and purse may pack the most punch, prevailing over words. But decisions about when and where to wield these weapons are made in the context of ideas. While it is not always specifically true that the pen is mightier than the sword, it therefore may be generally true.

The economic and political ideas most influential in shaping today's world affairs appear to be clustered into three major groups:

1. Capitalism (associated with the writings of Adam Smith);

2. Socialism/Communism (associated with the pen of Karl Marx); and

3. Fabianism (not so closely tied to a single author, but linked with the work of George Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, and Beatrice and Sidney Webb).

Present headquarters for capitalism as an ideology is the United States; for communism, Russia. Fabianism is alive if not well in England, where it was the intellectual foundation of the Labour Party. It has been very influential in developing countries via colonials who studied at the London School of Economics. Footnote 15

None of these ideologies contains a well-developed theory of international relations or world order. But all of them have inspired ideas about how the world should be organized. Most capitalists (in this ideological sense) appear to want a world of independent nation-states with full freedom of trade--but not of immigration--from place to place. Marxists' ideal future has no government at all, but favors some kind of universal government during the transition to communism. Fabians want more equality economically, but are more attached to individual liberty and democracy than the Marxist socialists. Capitalists seek a world in which most property is privately owned. Communists want to have all productive (capital) property publicly owned --by which they seem to mean governmentally, for now. Fabians do not like private property but shrink from the extreme actions necessary to destroy the concept. None of these systems appears to be a useful theoretical or practical guide to action under present conditions.

Propaganda

Basic irrelevance to the international relations of the ABC- MNC age does not render these ideas without significance. They remain powerful tools in the hands of propagandists for various countries. Each contains enough elements of sense to convince-- or even overwhelm--some people.

The pen has long been employed as a wartime tool. Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War, several hundred years B.C., is filled with examples of psychological warfare. But only in the twentieth century has the pen been used massively and methodically. War, of course, is exactly the kind of short-run conflict in which the sword and purse might be expected to be decisive. The influence of the pen may well be exaggerated by propagandists themselves. Writing is, after all, less unpleasant than fighting, and armies (especially, perhaps, conscripted ones) are full of people seeking safe assignments. It has been said that British propagandists during World War I lied like troopers, or lied instead of trooping. Footnote 16

Of course propagandizing for the losing side in a war can have its dangers. "Lord Haw Haw," an Englishman broadcasting Nazi propaganda programs to British troops during World War II, was hanged after the war. The German propaganda chief, Joseph Goebbels, committed suicide to avoid being captured. But "Tokyo Rose," a Japanese-American doing similar broadcasts from Tokyo, got off with a long jail sentence.

Diplomacy

The pen has not been sheathed in peacetime, as absence of overt military hostilities is now optimistically called. Just as soldiers are supposed to die, if necessary, for their country, diplomats are said to lie for their country. Particularly since the Russian Revolution, November 1917, diplomacy and propaganda have been intimately connected. Early on, the Bolshevik leaders spoke to the galleries as they purported to be conducting diplomatic negotiations. George Kennan speaks of "demonstrative diplomacy" in discussing how the Russians have tried to encourage the revolutionary overthrow of governments with which they were dealing. Footnote 17

Naturally, effective negotiations are impossible in the glare of publicity within which demonstrative diplomacy goes on. We have already noted the difficulty in achieving necessary flexibility when negotiations are public and the impossibility of Woodrow Wilson's ideal of "open covenants, openly arrived at." However, open negotiations may be accompanied by more serious discussions behind the scenes.

The United States suffers from serious disadvantages in wielding the pen abroad. With a free press, the government cannot put out propaganda for foreign consumption without provoking charges that the Administration is trying to flimflam the American people. That this is a serious problem can be seen in the rules forbidding U.S. Information Agency films from being shown on American television. Government also finds it impossible to claim that Americans are solidly behind it, for there is always somebody willing to articulate a lack of such support. When nothing better can be found, Pravda can always quote attacks on U.S. policies printed in the American Communist press.

Perhaps the biggest American handicap in the international propaganda battle is our lack of an articulated general ideology which can be expressed at the simplistic level required of propaganda. This has been a handicap in dealing both with Communists and with third parties.

THE DILEMMA OF FOREIGN POLICY

A coherent ideology is especially difficult to attain in a democracy. Everybody is free to criticize every weakness or inadequacy in any would-be official ideology, and various elements are likely to have extremely divergent views as to what the contents of that ideology should be. Since all presently available ideologies are inadequate, containing generous portions of nonsense as well as sense, none is likely to command enough support to be an official guide to action or basis for systematic propaganda.

Exercising the power of the pen, however, is not the only foreign affairs problem for democracies. Rational military policy may require occasional limited military actions in order to avoid circumstances in which large wars can occur; but limited wars and democracies do not mix well. Except when a foreign threat is obvious and immediate enough to arouse fears and tempers to the "total war, unconditional surrender" point, electorates are reluctant to pay taxes to support a volunteer- fought war. A draft opens up much public contention during any prolonged involvement of a democracy in a limited war.

Successful foreign policy-military and diplomatic-seems to require exactly those governmental traits that are most obnoxious to a democracy: secrecy and centralization. The hard fact must be faced, as Americans have never yet done, that diplomacy and democracy are in hopeless conflict. Unless we are willing to abandon our commitment to democracy, we therefore must draw the conclusion that diplomacy should be abandoned as soon as possible. Only a political system existing in total isolation from other independent political systems can hope to be fully democratic. But isolation at the national level is now both economically and technologically impossible. The only way to attain isolation will therefore be to create a universal or world government.

Any mention of a world government, however, provokes almost universal outrage. At least since World War I, with President Wilson's calls for "self-determination of peoples," self- determination has been an international sacred cow. In the U.S., the term "world government" suggests mushy-minded "one worldism," if not subversion. When unsuccessful Republican presidential candidate Wendel Wilkie returned from a world tour during World War II to write a book titled One World, a critic suggested it should have been called Gullible's Travels. World government talk does not sit well in a country whose chief national holiday, the Fourth of July, is Independence Day. Nor does the idea command broad support anywhere else. The U.N. Charter itself proclaims the desirability of sovereign independent nation-states. The rhetoric of decolonization speaks emphatically of "national freedom."

There can be no doubt that self-determination is a widely popular idea in today's world; and at the purely verbal level it is hard to disagree because "freedom" is, after all, good. When we look beneath the words, however, we discover that freedom has its general connotation of goodness because its basic connection is with individuals:

Freedom (of individuals) is good. (General agreement.)
Freedom (of countries) is good. (Apparently follows, logically.)
But what if there is a conflict between the requirements of maximized individual freedom and those of national freedom? Which is to be preferred if we cannot have both?

Let there be no doubt about it: individual liberty cannot be maximized in a world in which national liberty exists. Just as freedom of a government organization to do anything "it" wants must be restricted constitutionally before individual liberty can exist, so freedom of nations as presently understood must be destroyed. With national freedom comes restrictions on individual liberty in the name of national defense: high taxes, conscription, prohibition of travel to some other countries, obstacles to the flow of goods and ideas.

Rather than uncritically hailing the virtues of national freedom, serious thinkers must therefore ask how much are we willing to pay for it? In the near future, conducting foreign affairs will continue to be a regrettable necessity. Things cannot be improved overnight. But this is no excuse for failing to ask ourselves where we want to be going, or how to go about getting there.

SUMMARY

Immersed in foreign relations right from its independence, the U.S. is increasingly affected by developments in other parts of the world. New weapons and transportation technologies have combined with dependence on foreign oil and other resources to make national isolation absolutely impossible, no matter how desirable it might seem. Yet there are inherent tensions between the values of democracy and individual liberty, on the one hand, and the requirements of successful national defense and foreign policy, on the other.

Our thinking about foreign relations is hindered by the prevailing paradigm, which says that the world is made up of sovereign, independent nation-states and that this is also the way things should be. The paradigm is descriptively inadequate because it ignores the existence and increasing significance of multinational corporations and other NOSTACS. And it exaggerates the extent to which today's national governments are in fact independent. It is prescriptively inadequate in that it deflects our attention from the increasingly unacceptable costs of world anarchy. Realistically, foreign relations will continue to be a necessity for some time. But we should recognize that it is a regrettable necessity. We should try to lay the foundations for the eventual establishment of a world government which would put an end to international relations as we know them now.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. A newspaper story dated June 29, 1978 notes an interesting proposal:

A consortium of American and Canadian companies wants to construct a [natural gas] pipeline across the Bering Strait to Russia to hook up with a planned Alaska pipeline to the lower 48 states. (Detroit Free Press)

What political and economic consequences should be considered by the U.S. government in deciding whether to permit such a project to go forward? Would it make any difference if, instead of a pipeline bringing gas to the U.S. from Russia, the proposal was for an electrical cable that would bring solar electricity to the U.S. when it is night here, and return electricity to Russia when it is night there? (Such a cable could eliminate the storage problem usually seen as an obstacle to large-scale conversion to solar energy.)

2. Which weapon is the best (morally) with which to conduct foreign relations? Why? Can any country afford to rely exclusively on this weapon?

3. Discuss the adequacy of the following statement:

Military production diverts resources from production for useful goods. . . . [A]II American workers could have had more than an extra month of paid vacation annually if the same resources had gone to useful goods instead of to militarism. M. H. Best and W. E. Connolly, The Politicized Economy (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1976), p. 54.

4. The arms race presents an example of actions that make sense under the circumstances in which they are taken, but that indicate that these circumstances are pretty sorry ones. Why is it so hard to change these circumstances? What changes in circumstances does the text call for here?

5. What have been the appeals and disadvantages of military conscription in the U.S.? What are the alternatives to selective conscription?

6. "Fighting never solves anything." Does the text agree? Do you agree with the text? Why or why not?

7. Why is energy availability such a key issue for the American economy, government, and foreign relations?

8. Diagram the relation between MNCs and NOSTACS.

9. Explain why the solution employed by the U.S. to the problem of nationwide corporations that the various states were unable to control is not presently available for dealing with MNCS.

10. What would be the advantages and disadvantages of orbiting a TV transmitter to relay U.S. programs to the Soviet Union? What kinds of power would be used or implicated in such an operation?

*****************

Footnotes

* U.S. Supreme Court, Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918)

1. See R. W. Mansbach, Y. H. Ferguson, and D. E. Lampert, The Webb of World Politics.- Non State Actors in the Global System, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1976.

2. E. E. Schnattschneider, 200 Million Americans in Search of a Government, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969, p. 24.

3. See S. F. Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957.

4. See George F. Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin, Boston: Little Brown, 1960, pp. 120-150.

5. Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy: Three Essays, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969.

6. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

7. Charles A. Barker (ed.), Problems of World Disarmament, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963, pp. 58- 59.

8. Kennan, p. 315.

9. TheReportofthePresident'sCommissiononanAll- VolunteerArmedForceWashington,D.C.:Govemment Printing Office, 1970, pp. 8-9.

10. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

11. "The Working Class Against Monopolistic Octopuses," Pravda, September 20, 1974, p. 4.

12. Edward Higbee, A Question of Priorities, New York: Morrow, 1970, p. 14.

13. Anthony Sampson complains that "in 1971, there were at least six men at the top of ITT who were paid more than the President of the United States," an unspeakable rudeness! (The Sovereign State of ITT, New York: Stein & Day, 1973, p. 132.)

14. John M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1936, pp. 383- 384.

15. Daniel P. Moynihan, "The United States in Opposition," 59 Commentary 31-44 (1975).

16. M. Garnett, "Propaganda," 147 Contemporary Review 574 (1935).

17. Kennan, p. 34.