Friday, April 14, 2023

Chapter 2: The Simplest Human Situation: Work and Survival

 

Chapter 2: The Simplest Human Situation: Work and Survival

Chapter Objectives

After reading this chapter you ought to understand:

  • 1. The differences between decisions about what to do and decisions about what is true.

  • 2. The relationship between decision and action; what is meant by each of the elements in the formula A---> X+Y indicating action, desired result of the action, and side effects.

  • 3. How modifying any of these elements creates changes in all the others.

  • 4. How circumstances C affect action A.

  • 5. The distinction between rational action and fanatical action.

  • 6. The two basic "factors" or ingredients of all production, and why a third factor, often listed with the other two, is not basic.

  • 7. The relationship between the concept of investment and decisions analyzed in terms of circumstances, actions, goals, and side effects.

  • 8. What is meant by each of the elements in the expression S = Ap/D

Key Terms

capital
materials
costs
principle of rational ignorance
factors of production
investment
rational action
labor intensive production
satisfaction

I am convinced that political science is an informal discipline and that many, if not most, of its problems are the consequence of linguistic (or, if one would like, conceptual) confusion.*

In the next three chapters we will make use of the strategies suggested in Chapter 1. Starting with the simplest human situation, we will proceed to more complex interactions, introducing useful concepts at the earliest opportunity. This chapter concentrates on an individual adult human being, the basic unit of society, as he or she might exist in total isolation. Taking Robinson Crusoe as our pattern, we will examine cause and effect in nature, most basic economic concepts, and concepts of decision making. Chapter 3 introduces additional individuals, enabling us to consider associations of two or more people, and Chapter 4 brings us up to the level of complexity necessary to discuss government.

Although we will draw examples from American politics, these three chapters will not concentrate on American government. Our government's complexities are a thicket for unsystematic thinkers. It is better to prepare ourselves by examining simpler systems so that we can later master these complexities than to come straight to the point and find ourselves unprepared. In Marxist dialectical terms, then, these chapters are one step backward enabling us to take two steps forward later on. In capitalist terms, they are an investment.

ROBINSON CRUSOE: A "SOCIETY" OF ONE

Perhaps you are already acquainted with Daniel Defoe's fictional character, Robinson Crusoe, that unusual man whose adventures were described in a novel written over 250 years ago. Crusoe is a restless young Englishman. Ignoring wise parental advice to settle down, he goes to sea and, after a number of adventures, establishes a prosperous plantation in Brazil. Then, his restlessness returns and he goes back to sea. This time, Crusoe's ship is caught in a really disastrous storm which kills all of his shipmates and casts him up on a tropical island. For a quarter of a century, Crusoe lives totally isolated from other human beings. During this period he constitutes the smallest possible "society," the simplest human situation.

Two things about Crusoe's circumstances should be noted. First, he had been raised in a culture. Thus he had learned a language and acquired a fund of knowledge not all of which derived from his own efforts. In addition to his personal experiences in England, Brazil, and at sea, Crusoe had the benefit of some book learning. He received the counsel of others, even though he did not always heed it. Crusoe was thus not a "self-made" man and he was not brought up from infancy by wolves. He was not a "noble savage" but a full-fledged product of civilization. Like Mark Twain's Connecticut Yankee, fictionally deposited back in time from nineteenth-century America to the medieval court of King Arthur, Crusoe arrived on his island knowing many things. These proved helpful to his survival in isolation.

Second, the isolated Crusoe was not entirely deprived of the material products of civilization. His wrecked ship remained aground near the island for several days, and Crusoe salvaged provisions and tools from it. He also stripped another wrecked ship some years later. Crusoe helped himself to food, seeds, guns and knives, a Bible, and some money. He thus benefited from civilization even while isolated from it.

Economists have long realized the advantages of simple illustrations, and hypothetical Crusoe societies are common in classical economics. Analysis of Crusoe's experience is useful because many basic concepts apply even to isolated individuals and thinking about an individual minimizes distractions, preventing us from blaming inherent aspects of the human predicament on particular social arrangements. Crusoe societies are conspicuously absent, however, from political analysis. This may be because philosophers have generally portrayed man as a "social" animal. A society of one can have no politics or government. Nor can any such society last very long. Since regularities and continuing social patterns have been central concerns of political philosophers, Crusoe analysis must have seemed useless.

However when we are surrounded by something, as we are by government, it is difficult to understand what it is all about. Some elements of political systems are present even in a one- person society, and we do well to understand these elements first. For example, decision making is obviously an important part of politics. The president of the United States must decide who to appoint to the Supreme Court. He must decide whether to recognize a revolutionary regime that grabs power in South America. He must decide what energy legislation to recommend to Congress. Every congressman, judge, bureaucrat, voter, or person dealing with government must make decisions. Even Crusoe had to make decisions. But his decisions did not consider anticipated reactions of other people. These decisions were accordingly more straightforward than those of a person living among others. A Crusoe society is therefore a good place to begin our study of government.

Economic relations are also an important part of sociopolitical systems. It is impossible to study politics methodically without employing basic economic concepts. As we have already noted, Crusoe analysis is traditional in economic literature. Again, it follows that analysis of a one-person society is an appropriate part of political literature.

Crusoe's Decisions

Decisions on What to Do. Robinson Crusoe faces many choices of action during his isolated life on the island. He must decide where to build his house. Various conflicting considerations occur to him. He wants to avoid the low ground near the sea, believing it unhealthy. He wants a handy source of fresh water. He wants shelter from the sun, for his island is very tropical. He wants security "from ravenous creatures, whether men or beasts," [Footnote 1] for he has not yet learned that he is alone on the island. And he wants a good view of the ocean, "that if God sent any ship in sight I might not lose any advantage for my deliverance." [Footnote 2] Crusoe finds an acceptable location, but later considers moving when another factor arises--security from earthquakes.

Crusoe must also decide what kind of house to build. Debating between a cave and a tent, he opts for both, gaining the advantages of each at the expense of extra labor. He has a few barley and rice seeds, and he must decide when to plant these. Timing can be all-important in agriculture, and some seeds are lost when Crusoe sows them "just before the dry season." [Footnote 3] Fortunately, he has forseen this possibility and reserved some seeds for another try. Even so, it takes some years to multiply the original "ten or twelve" grains until he can stop using the entire crop for more seed. "It was not until the fourth year, that I could allow myself the least grain of this corn to eat." Footnote 4

Crusoe must also consider whether to leave his island and how to do so. He believes that he is close to South America. However, he has doubts about the boat he builds, and is nearly swept out to sea during a test run. He also fears being captured by cannibals even if he makes it to the mainland. Weighing these conflicting considerations, Crusoe stays put, preferring a tolerable though unsociable present to the risks of leaving.

Crusoe enjoys fresh meat. But he knows he cannot replace his gunpowder when it is gone. Accordingly, he encloses some land and grazes captured goats there so he will not have to go hunting. Thanks to his conservation measures, Crusoe still has gunpowder left 25 years later.

Analysis of Crusoe's Decisions on Actions. Crusoe's decision- making exhibits a definite pattern. First he wants something (bread, security, fresh meat, getting back to civilization, etc.). Then he seeks an action that will give him what he wants. Abstractly, we can call what he wants X, and the action which he thinks will give him what he wants, A. The relationship between X and A can be expressed using an arrow to symbolize cause and effect:

A ---> X

Crusoe's beliefs about the actions that will produce a desired effect derive from experience-personal and vicarious-and from reason. He knows that seeds will not grow unless planted, and perhaps not even then. He knows about other people's experience with wild animals and can imagine the consequences of building the wrong kind of shelter in the wrong location.

Crusoe, however, does not think merely of a goal and of actions which will deliver it. He does not think only of X and A. He does not think:

1. I want X,;
2. Action A will give me X,;
3. Therefore I will take action A.

Crusoe considers one more thing: what are the side effects of taking this particular action A? What may be the side effects of sowing all my grain at once? What are the side effects of building in an otherwise optimum location where I cannot see the ships that might sail past? What else will happen if I supply all of my meat by hunting with my gun? What side effects do I risk in leaving my island by boat and if I succeed in reaching the mainland?

Thus Crusoe thinks not only about actions necessary to produce a particular desired effect, but also about other effects that will be produced by each action. Full analysis of Crusoe's decisions about what to do therefore requires an additional symbol Y, standing for the side effects of an action A taken in pursuit of goal X.-

A ---> X + Y

Naturally, Crusoe wants to get what he wants. By definition, X stands for something he wants. But he does not necessarily want to take just any action which will give him X. Some actions that will deliver X may also produce side effects that he dislikes. Shooting wild game will deliver desired food. But the side effects are that he will soon run out of irreplaceable gunpowder. This result is doubly unfortunate, for it will deprive Crusoe both of future meat and of the security provided by his guns. What to do?

Abstract          A --->   X      +       Y   
Level

           shooting --->  meat    +    insecurity
Concrete               (short run)       no meat  
Level                                  (long run)

Regarded abstractly, Crusoe's alternatives obviously fell into three general categories:

  • First: He can seek a different action that will produce the same goal but different,,hopefully less unsatisfactory side effects:

Al ---> X + Y1

If such an action is available, this is the ideal solution. In Crusoe's case, there is such an option--domestication of animals--and he takes it. But we cannot always find happy answers. Crusoe, for example, could use a wheelbarrow, but he cannot figure out how to produce one, with or without acceptable side effects:

And as to a wheelbarrow, I fancied I could make all but the wheel, but that I had no notion of, neither did I know how to go about it; besides, I had no possible way to make the iron gudgeons for the spindle or axis of the wheel to run in . ..> Footnote 5
  • Second, Crusoe can modify his original objective to one that can be reached by an action whose side effects are acceptable. Crusoe adopts this approach in the face of his wheelbarrow problems. He makes a hod, a pole with a platform at the top to use to carry heavy loads.

no available action  ---> wheelbarrow  +  side   effects
    
        A            --->       X      +       Y

        A2--->       X1 +        Y2

  Fabricating        --->     hod      +   considerable                 
                                             time spent

The hod is different enough from a wheelbarrow that Crusoe is able to make it. Of course, it is not as efficient as a wheelbarrow would be for hauling away dirt from the cave he is digging. But it serves some of the same purposes. Compromising on goals is not always possible. And sometimes even a compromised goal cannot be reached without strongly undesired side effects. Thus, Crusoe's desire to return to civilization is frustrated both by his inability to figure out how to do it without unacceptable risk and by the impossibility of compromising this goal. Either one returns to civilization, or one does not.

  • Third: Crusoe can "make his bargain with the devil." If no reasonably satisfactory solution can be found, he must ask himself. Do I want this goal badly enough to incur extremely unpleasant side effects? Or do I want to avoid the side effects badly enough to abandon this particular goal? Here, the decision is between:

 sail away   --->    possible return  +   possible fatal  
                     to civilization       shipwreck or
                                            cannibals

    A        --->          X          +        Y


   not A     --->        not X        +       not Y                       

 stay put    --->       unlikely to   +       no danger of
                         return to            shipwreck;
                        civilization         little danger
                                             from cannibals;
                                             risks of
                                             remaining

Neither available action is completely satisfactory, but Crusoe cannot choose not to choose. As always, he will do what he prefers, that is, he will do what appears most promising, or least unpromising. Here, the circumstances are so unfavorable that the best available action is none too good. In the fictional event, Crusoe remains on his island until rescued unexpectedly by a European ship.

Rational Action and Fanatical Action

The decision-making approach we have been discussing is often called "rational action." Fanaticism is its opposite. Fanatic actors who want X and believe that action A will give them X need think no further:
X is desired;
A ---> X;
Therefore, A.
Fanatics may want the same things as people who act more rationally. They see connections between what they want and possible actions. All that they lack is the concept of side effects. Rational actors merely ask one additional question: what are the side effects of action A? But the changes generated by considering side effects change also the process:

  • 1. pursuing the same goal with a different action--
    A
    l ---> X + Y1

  • 2. modifying the goal so it can be reached by a still different action--
    A
    2---> X1 + Y2

  • 3. making one of two possible "bargains with the devil"--
    A ---> X + Y
    not A ---> not + not Y
    Crusoe, as it turns out, acts very rationally during his lonely sojourn on the island. 
    Footnote 6

Distinctions between Rational and Irrational Actions. Rational actions should not be regarded as the opposite of "emotional" ones. It is an intellectual task to visualize connections between actions and consequences, as symbolized by the arrow -. Our experience, knowledge, and ability to reason by analogy enable us to anticipate consequences. But our emotions are also involved in rational decisions. Metaphorically speaking, we use our "heads" to project the consequences of alternative actions and our "hearts" to evaluate these consequences. If we have no feelings about different consequences, we cannot act rationally any more than if we are unable to predict probable consequences. Both intellect and emotions are therefore necessary when we make decisions.

We should also avoid confusing rationality with morality. An action is rational to the extent it is well-calculated to give the person taking it the greatest possible net amount of what he or she wants. But actions that are rational may be immoral if the actors do not want what they ought to want according to some external or cosmic yardstick. We might agree that Adolf Hitler's campaign to exterminate the Jews was reasonably rational given Hitler's values; few would argue that his actions were moral. Even as the Bible-reading Robinson Crusoe was acting very rationally on his island, he entertained serious doubts about the morality of some actions he was considering.

The Effect of Circumstances Upon Decisions

One additional element must be introduced into our abstract analysis of decisions: the circumstances within which actions occur. Circumstances make some actions completely impossible. In Crusoe's case they made it impossible to build a wheelbarrow. And circumstances may strongly affect the actual results produced by a given action. Crusoe, for example, originally stored all of his precious gunpowder in a single dry location. Under some circumstances this concentration might have been sound enough policy, but it transpired that Crusoe's island was subject to thunderstorms:

I was not so much surprised with the lightning, as I was with a thought which darted into my mind as swift as the lightning itself. 0 my powder! My very heart sunk within me when I thought, that at one blast all my powder might be destroyed, on which, not my defence only, but the providing me food, as I thought, entirely depended. . . . Such impression did this make upon me, that after the storm was over I laid aside all my works, my building, and fortifying, and applied myself to make bags and boxes to separate the powder, and keep it a little and a little in a parcel, in hope that whatever might come it might not all take fire at once, and to keep it so apart, that it should not be possible to make one part fire another. Footnote 7

We can use a large letter C, printed so that it surrounds the capital A standing for actions, to symbolize circumstances. [In this Web-version of this book, the example is omitted to simplify transmission over the Internet.] Sometimes the C may be omitted for simplicity, but it is always present by implication. All actions are under particular circumstances. The letter C is ideal for representing these, and not just because it is the first letter in "circumstances." If we imagine that the C is a semicircular fence observed from a helicopter, limiting the directions in which people located within it can go, we see that basically they can go east, northeast, southeast, or any direction in this range. But the fence prevents them from going north, south, west, and the like. If the circumstances change, thus actions previously possible become impossible, and vice versa. Now the people can go only in westerly directions. Rationality of an action may depend heavily on specific circumstances. Let us say that Crusoe, if the actions were available to him in his circumstances, would prefer Al over A2, A2 over A3, and A3 over A4. If actual circumstances permit only actions 1, 2 and 3, then his rational choice is Al, while A3 will be his worst choice. If, however, circumstances permit only actions 3 and 4, then it is rational for him to choose A3. By analogy, the same reasoning can be applied to questions of morality. Moral action is what we would do if we wanted what we ought to and acted rationally. As circumstances make different actions possible or impossible, the action which is morally best (or least bad) may therefore change.

Decisions on What Is True

Decisions, of course, are not always about what to do, and the formula A ---> X + Y applies only to this type of decision. We also make decisions about what is true. Sometimes we call these "conclusions." Whatever we call them, decisions about what is true are very important. Crusoe, for example, puzzles over a footprint he finds in the sand. Is it the Devil's? Is it evidence of savages visiting from the mainland? Is it possibly a print left by Crusoe himself?

The footprint greatly agitates Crusoe, and his efforts to figure out its true meaning are not just philosophical speculations. Decisions about what to do depend on his decisions about what is true. If it is his own footprint, he can continue living as freely as ever. But Crusoe has to reject this explanation, after comparing the print with his own foot. If the print indicates a visiting cannibal, on the other hand, Crusoe might want to live a more retiring life. Deciding that this is the true explanation, Crusoe fortifies his house and puts guns in strategic places. He moves some goats to other locations where they will not all come to harm at once. He begins carrying a gun everywhere, but does not fire it for two years for fear of attracting attention.

In deciding what to do, we make or assume decisions about what is true, our alternatives under the circumstances, the consequences if we take this action or that action, and so forth. But there are other relations between the two kinds of decision. Decisions about what to do help make certain things true in the future. Sometimes we make experiments, decisions about what to do attempting to determine what is true. Crusoe was doing this when he placed his own foot in the troublesome print in the sand. Knowledge about what is true can thus be the goal X in pursuit of which an action A is taken.

CRUSOE AND THE ECONOMICS OF PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION

Robinson Crusoe does not lack all benefits of civilization. He salvages considerable food, drink, clothing, and gunpowder from his ship. He knows, however, that these will not last. He therefore confronts an unfortunate requirement: work or starve! This dilemma is not his fault, but it cannot be blamed on anybody else, either. That Crusoe must work or starve is nobody's fault; it simply describes the circumstances in which he happens to find himself. Crusoe, here, can be seen as a symbol of the human race taken as a whole. In normal society it is not true that every individual must work or starve. Although nothing can be consumed that has not first been produced, it is quite possible for some individuals to consume more than they produce, to consume even if they produce nothing. We can consume more than we produce if some other individuals produce more than they consume. But what is true for individuals in normal society is clearly not true for humanity as a whole. For humanity, there is no "somebody else" to do the necessary work. For humanity, the rule is work or starve. Crusoe's position is thus more like that of the human species than it is of normal individual members of that species. Even so, we can uncover many economic concepts merely by observing him.

Factors of Production: Materials

Crusoe's case provides insights into what economists call the "factors of production." Materials--including land, water, minerals, air, sunlight, and everything else provided to us by "nature" without any expenditure of human effort--are an obvious requirement for producing anything.

What Are Materials? Two things are notable about Crusoe's materials. First, he is free to use anything he can handle to which he has physical access. Lack of proper tools prevents him from putting some resources to work. Having no saw, Crusoe tediously makes boards by hacking away at a downed tree with an ax "till I had brought it to be thin as a plank, and then dub it smooth with my adze." [Footnote 8] However there are no additional limits on Crusoe's use of natural resources. There is no "property," for there is nobody else to claim exclusive rights to particular materials. When Crusoe kills a wild goat or a turtle, he is not a poacher; when he chops down a tree he is not a trespasser. The concepts of property and ownership simply cannot apply to a one-person society.

Are Materials Available? Second, natural resources can be scarce even under Crusoe's circumstances. Seeds, for example, are provided by nature, yet Crusoe begins with only a handful of barley and rice seeds. Commenting on the uselessness of his money, Crusoe observes that

I would have given it all for six-penny-worth of turnip and carrot seed out of England, or for a handful of peas and beans . . . . BFootnote 9

Even Crusoe must, therefore, distribute some resources among conflicting uses. The side effect of using them for one purpose is to make them unavailable for another. Hence, Crusoe makes no bread for four years so he can use all of his initial seeds to produce more seeds.

Weighing Costs and Benefits. Weighing costs and benefits of particular uses of scarce resources, Crusoe necessarily makes value judgments. He compares the value he places on each possible use of the resources and acts to get what he values most. He values plentiful future bread more than the single loaf he could make using all of his initial grain, so he bakes no bread for the time being. No bread now is the cost or side effect of acting to secure large amounts of future bread. Thus, in a society with no property, no money, and no trade, the concept of costs is fully applicable. Crusoe's costs may be merely "opportunity costs," but they are still real. Costs, unlike money and property, are not an inherently social phenomenon.

Still, while natural resource scarcities restrict Crusoe, they are not obnoxious. His island is big, fertile, and well stocked with trees and edible plants and animals. Environmentally, he is well off and well aware of this fact.

Labor

A second factor of production is human labor. Crusoe works long and hard to make a living out of the available materials. Some things come practically ready to consume, but even turtle eggs must be picked up and cooked. These two operations represent two basic things accomplished by human labor: 1) modifying an object's location and 2) modifying its form. Picking the egg up changes its location, adding what economists call a "place utility." It is worth more to Crusoe in his mouth than lying on the ground, hence he willingly reaches down and picks it up. Cooking the egg changes its form, making it more palatable to a person of Crusoe's tastes.

What Kind of Labor? Crusoe endlessly moves things from one place to another. He moves raisins from where the grapes dried to where he stores them. He moves dirt, without benefit of the lamented wheelbarrow. He moves animals that he has killed. He removes valuable items from the wrecked ship before it disappears for good. He moves his gunpowder to protect it from lightning. He moves goats to protect them from the cannibals. Trying to move a giant log hollowed out to make a boat, Crusoe finds that he is not strong enough. He would like to move himself back to civilization, but is unable to do so for 26 years. Likewise, Crusoe changes the form of many things. He digs the cave, changing the local terrain as well as changing the location of the dirt. He converts animal skins into clothing. He hollows out the tree trunk to make a boat, and hacks other trees into boards for use around the house. He plants trees in a pattern to make a hedge.

How Much Labor? How does Crusoe decide how much labor to perform? He has no "boss" to tell him what to do or when, or for how long. Yet these decisions somehow get made, by Crusoe himself. Obviously, he must decide within certain limits. If he works too little or does the wrong things, he may starve. On the other hand, Crusoe can perform a certain maximum amount of labor by working himself to the bone. Within these limits, Crusoe's decisions about how much work to do depend on the things he wants and on the relative importance or value he places on each.

Over the long haul, Crusoe's limited ability to consume appears to be his chief basis for deciding how much to work. Speaking of his barley and rice, after he had gotten the seed problem cleared up, Crusoe notes that

I resolved to see what quantity would be sufficient for me for a whole year, and to sow but once a year. Upon the whole, I found that the forty bushels of barley and rice was much more than I could consume in a year; so I resolved to sow just the same quantity every year that I sowed the last, in hopes that such a quantity would fully provide me with bread, etc. Footnote 10

And he observes later that "all I could make use of was all that was valuable." [Footnote 11] Crusoe does not appear to have been greatly interested in leisure. Time not spent producing basic requirements he devotes to labor with a very low rate of return, like making boards so he can have a shelf in his cave. He admits to the "prodigious deal of time and labor which it took me up to make a plank or board." But, he adds, "my time or labor was little worth, and so it was as well employed one way as another." [Footnote 12] It appears in fact that Crusoe is something of a workaholic! But only when he wants something immediately, as when he is trying to salvage things from his wrecked ship, is his daily labor limited by sheer exhaustion.

Insurance. Interestingly, Crusoe produces a considerable amount of insurance. During his agricultural experiments, he reserves seeds in case the first crop is ruined. The cost of this insurance is the additional production that he would have gotten by planting all the seeds if the crop did not fail. Fearing savages, he increases his crop in case some of it is destroyed or captured by marauders. This too is insurance, for which he pays with increased labor in his fields. Likewise, the labor required to decentralize his gunpowder supply after the electrical storm is an insurance cost.

Capital

The third thing generally considered a factor of production is "capital." Conventionally, the list of factors includes: land (including the things found on or under it), labor, and capital. Labor is perhaps the easiest of these things to understand. Materials present few difficulties, although it is confusing to call this factor as a whole "land," a term literally pointing only to a part of it. Capital, however, seems to be harder for many people to grasp, and perhaps the best approach is to discard it completely as a factor of production. While capital is a necessary concept, we need not place it on the same level with materials and labor in our analysis, for it is merely one possible combination of these.

What is Capital? Capital consists of things that are: 1) produced; 2) but not intended to be consumed as such. Production, as we have seen, requires human labor as well as materials. But human labor is not expended for no reason. As Robinson Crusoe concedes, "[AIII the good things of this world are no further use to us than they are for our use." [Footnote 13] Yet Crusoe produces capital. It follows, then, that consumption is only one possible use of things that we have produced.

Kinds of Capital. Crusoe produces many kinds of capital. One of his earliest efforts is to plant seeds, and his immediate object is to produce more seeds. He does not intend to consume these seeds, but to plant them. These seeds are, therefore, capital. Crusoe produces them in order to increase future grain production so he can use part of the harvest to make bread. When this happy stage is reached, four years later, he divides subsequent grain crops into two parts: most of it he processes further and bakes into bread; the rest he retains as seed for the future. The grain turned into bread is a "consumer good," and that reserved as seed is a "capital good."

Crusoe also produces tools. He spends time and labor making a hod. He does not want to consume the hod, but to use it to haul away dirt extracted from his cave-house. He spends a week making a heavy spade with which to dig up additional land before sowing his enlarged stock of seeds. Again, these are not consumer goods but capital enhancing his future productivity.

Capital vs. Consumer Goods. These kinds of production can be sharply distinguished from Crusoe's other output. The raisins he produces are intended for direct consumption. Other food that he grows, shoots, or raises is destined to be eaten. Crusoe wears the clothing that he manages to make. These are consumer goods, not goods that are used in producing other things.

There is another basic difference between capital goods and consumer goods. The latter are absolutely essential. Crusoe will starve if he does not produce enough of these. Capital goods, however, he can do without. Under his fortunate circumstances, he could probably even manage without seed grain and just eat wild plants. The hod is not essential in digging out his cave. Even his shovel is expendable, for he could dig the cave with his bare hands. And it is the same case with his spade; land could be plowed up without it. Crusoe's expenditure of labor to produce capital is not wasted, however. This work reduces the total labor required to produce a given amount of consumer goods. Days spent making the hod, for example, are more than compensated for by Crusoe's increased efficiency in hauling dirt away from his cave. Work that might take two months without the hod may take only one month with it. If it takes three days to make the hod, he has still accomplished in 33 days what otherwise would have taken 60. The hod is worth making even if it wears completely out and is useless by the end of 30 days' use.

Not every tool will be such a bargain for Crusoe. The time saved using some tools may be less than that necessary for producing them. Crusoe will not make such tools, but will prefer to achieve his objectives using direct labor. The breakeven point, at which Crusoe is indifferent, between making the tool or producing directly will be where the tool takes so much time to make that it exactly cancels out the time saved in using it.

Labor Intensive and Capital Intensive Production. Economists call the approach that uses little or no capital "labor intensive" production and the approach that uses the tool "capital intensive." As Crusoe's story makes clear, there is no one ideal level of labor or capital intensivity for production in general. Rather, the ideal combination of direct and indirect labor depends on the circumstances of each case. For example, capital intensive production may make sense in the United States where labor is relatively scarce and expensive and capital relatively plentiful, but not in China where labor is plentiful and cheap and capital is scarce.

Investment

Viewed abstractly, investment is merely consumption postponed in order to do things that allow us to consume more in the future. Crusoe invested in a hod, in a fence, in seeds, in order to increase his standard of living later on. Investment can also be viewed in terms of our decision-making formulation

A ---> X + Y. One objective X we can pursue is to make future circumstances different from what they would otherwise be. Today's action helps to shape these circumstances, and we are investing to the extent that we do this rather than seeking particular immediate results. If Crusoe produces a hod, his future circumstances will include an enlarged opportunity; now he can choose between using and not using that tool. Since his productivity is enhanced by the hod, his circumstances are improved. As we will see later, investment is a concept with important political as well as economic implications.

Karl Marx maintained that capital was merely stored up labor, and as we have seen this is not completely untrue. Capital is partly stored up labor, labor used indirectly rather than directly in producing goods for consumption. But capital, like all production, is also partly materials. And we will see in due course that the element of value contributed to production by natural resource scarcities has been very troublesome for governments. Under Crusoe's peculiar circumstances, however, resource scarcities are not generally a pressing matter; in these circumstances, Marx's "labor theory of value" probably comes as close as it ever can to being economically correct.

Crusoe's Standard of Living

As we have seen, Robinson Crusoe's standard of living is limited by his natural environment. Within these limits, Crusoe's "income" or ability to consume depends upon his decisions. He must decide what to produce, how much of each thing to produce, and how to produce each thing. A great deal of his ability to produce derives from knowledge brought with him or gained on the island. Thus knowledge itself is a capital good, in a way, as well as being a consumer good to the extent that Crusoe enjoys knowing certain things for their own sake. Attaining knowledge, like all other production and pursuit of goals, has its costs or side effects, as any college student well knows. Indeed, an economist, Fritz Machlup, has written a book on The Production and Distribution of Knowledge,Footnote 14 indicating that it can be treated just like any other commodity. At some point the costs of seeking further knowledge may outweigh its benefits, and at this point it becomes rational to stop seeking extra knowledge. Thus it is not paradoxical to speak of a "principle of rational ignorance."

Crusoe's standard of living is perhaps most notable for those things by which it is not limited. His goods are not sought by human robbers, though he does have problems with birds eating his crops. His living standards are not reduced by competition for the available natural resources from other people. He pays no taxes, and he pays no "protection money" to private extortionists. He gives nothing to the church or to the support of other worthy causes, for there are none on his island. And his personal consumption is not reduced by other people for whose support he is or feels responsible. There is, therefore, a direct relation between Crusoe's standard of living and his labor. But there is also no one to whom Crusoe can turn for support if he becomes unable to work. He must work or starve. If he works, he will not starve. For individuals living in complex societies, things are not always this simple.

POWER, SATISFACTION, AND THE ISOLATED INDIVIDUAL

Power. A society of one solitary human adult is the ideal place to begin considering power, a basic political concept. For a Crusoe, power can consist only of control over the motions of non-human material. Crusoe, for example, has the power necessary to cut down a tree and turn it into a boat. However, he cannot move that boat to the nearby ocean. He lacks the power to do this task.

In this context, power is virtually identical with causation, symbolized with the arrow in the formula: A---> X + Y. To say that Crusoe lacks power to move the boat is to say that he cannot cause that boat to move. Apparently in our dealings with nature power and causation are merely two different words pointing to a single concept. If none of our dealings were with other people, we should therefore abandon one of these two words completely. But, as we will see in the next chapter, "power" and "causation" refer to separate concepts when employed to describe human interactions.

Satisfaction. Satisfaction can be defined as the ratio between an individual's perceived attainments and desires:

                                Perceived attainments
              Satisfaction =   _____________________
                                     Desires


                                        Ap
                 S         =      ____________ 
                                        D

Changing Attainments. There are only two ways in which a Crusoe's attainments can be changed: First, by events in the natural environment. For example, Crusoe's attainments were adversely affected by several storms, by an earthquake, and by hungry birds. His very exile from civilization, a great decrease in his attainments, was caused by the mighty storm that smashed his ship and killed its other passengers. Had his gunpowder supply been ignited by lightning, Crusoe's attainments would have been badly set back. The natural course of events can also, of course, increase attainments. Crusoe's are increased when his wrecked ship is swept in close to shore by the tides, for this provides salvage opportunities he otherwise would not have had. Second, the solitary individual's attainments can be modified by his own actions. In the formula

A ---> X + Y, all of the letters except the A refer to actual or potential attainments. While actions are always intended to maximize attainments, their actual consequences are not always positive. Results are never entirely predictable. Crusoe, realizing that he could not be sure of the actual results of sailing to the mainland in a homemade boat, plays it safe and stays put. On his one experimental voyage, unexpected tides nearly sweep him out to sea, which would be a reduced attainment to say the least.

Changing Satisfaction. Just as there are two ways in which a Crusoe's attainments can be increased or decreased, so there are three ways that a given change in satisfaction can be produced. These are quite obviously indicated by the three elements in the definition or equation of satisfaction:

                                    Ap
                  S    =    ___________________
                                    D

A change in Crusoe's satisfaction can be produced first, by changed attainments, assuming that he is aware of them. Crusoe obviously takes great pleasure in being cast up from the stormy sea onto his island. His attainments have increased, and he is fully aware of that fact. A change in Crusoe's satisfaction can also be produced by a changed perception of his attainments. He panics when he discovers the human footprint. The island is the same as it always has been, that is, subject to periodic visits by parties of cannibals. Crusoe's attainments remain unchanged. But his satisfaction is greatly reduced by his new perception of the continuing fact.

A third way Crusoe's satisfaction can change is by a change in his desires. Once he has gotten used to his peculiar situation and reflected upon it, his satisfaction increases:

I now looked upon the [outside] world as a thing remote, which I had nothing to do with, no expectations from, and, indeed, no desires about. . . . I had now brought my state of life to be much easier in itself than it was at first, and much easier to my mind, as well as to my body. . . . I learned to look more upon the bright side of my condition, and less upon the dark side, and to consider what I enjoyed, rather than what I wanted. . . . All our discontents . . . appeared to me to spring from the want of thankfulness for what we have. Footnote 15

In other words, we can achieve the same satisfaction by wanting what we can get as we do by getting what we want.

Of course changes in the numerator produce changes in satisfaction that are opposite to equivalent changes in the denominator. That is, satisfaction is increased either by increased attainments or by decreased desires. We might parenthetically note here that increasing attainments appears to be the solution of choice in western culture, while decreasing desires is the more typical prescription of the oriental philosophies. Indeed, there is a mathematical validity to Nirvana: when desires are reduced to zero, satisfaction becomes infinite.

Changes need not take place in only one element of satisfaction at one time. Changes in one element produce the indicated changes in satisfaction only if everything else remains equal. When everything else does not remain equal, interesting things can happen. For example, satisfaction can actually fall as perceived attainments increase if increased attainments are more than cancelled out by simultaneously increasing desires. This theoretical conclusion is by no means devoid of practical significance. Political observers are well acquainted with "revolutions of rising expectations." Many sweeping revolutions have followed periods of increasing general prosperity. [Footnote 16] And the urban riots during the mid- 1960s came when more progress was being made by members of the black community than ever before and, perhaps, ever since.

Increased attainments may whet the appetite for more as well as proving that things need not remain the same forever. As attainments improve, desires may increase, thus reducing net satisfaction and increasing frustration. The converse is also true. As prospects for future progress dim, a decrease in the rate at which desires are increasing may allow satisfaction to rise despite a slowdown in improved attainments. Under President Nixon, in whom black people placed few hopes, the riots soon came to an end. There was, therefore, a certain logic to Daniel P. Moynihan's "secret" memo urging Nixon to treat the black community with "benign neglect."

Once again, however, we are anticipating the more complex issues that will be treated in later chapters. The time has come for us to bid farewell to the isolated Robinson Crusoe and turn our attention to a society in which there are human associations.

SUMMARY

By observing a solitary individual, we have identified many elements of a complex society. Decisions must be made in simple as well as in complicated situations. A Crusoe has goals, just as each person in a city, state, or country does. The isolated individual is not alone in having to consider the probable side effects of his actions, and each action's rationality always depends upon the circumstances. Even a Crusoe must give up some desired things in order to get others, seek better ways to attain desired goals, and abandon some other goals. Neighbors, whose reactions we must anticipate and live with, may tighten the limits within which we act, but they do not create them.

Likewise, many basic economic concepts-essential in untangling the baffling complexities of mass societies-are useful even in thinking about Crusoe. In Crusoe, we meet the basic factors of production-materials and labor-as well as capital, a nonbasic factor. Crusoe makes investments and produces some kinds of insurance, and he considers costs as well as benefits in deciding what to do.

Satisfaction can be defined in terms of attainments, perceptions, and desires. Satisfaction clearly is a concept applicable to isolated individuals, but it represents the end of the line for the analysis of the isolated Crusoe. One person's attainments--one of the elements of its definition--may be affected by another's actions. Having gone as far as we can in thinking about Crusoe, we must now therefore sacrifice the advantages of maximum simplicity in order to look at situations involving more than one person: societies, in the full sense of the term.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

  • 1. Is it unrealistic to imagine a "society of one," as we have done here? What advantages might this "unrealism" have in developing our ability to think systematically about politics?

  • 2. Are Crusoe's decisions easier or harder to make as a result of his total isolation from other people? Why?

  • 3. Why can't Crusoe have everything he wants, even though he has no neighbors to get in his way?

  • 4. State an example of a decision you have made, or might make, and explain how it can be thought about in terms of C, A, X, and Y.

  • 5. Explain why rational action is not the opposite of emotional action; give an example.

  • 6. What is the difference between the rationality and the morality of an action? How many possible combinations of these types of action can you imagine? Give examples.

  • 7. Why are the circumstances in which we act important?

  • 8. What other kinds of decisions do we make in addition to decisions about what to do? What relation is there between these different types of decisions?

  • 9. According to the text, what are the two things necessary for production to take place? Explain why the third thing commonly cited as a "factor of production" is not included as a separate factor here.

  • 10. Define a capital good, giving both an example and a contrasting example of a non-capital good.

  • 11. Crusoe is surrounded by all sorts of things, both natural and man-made. How, then, can it be said that there is no property on his island?

  • 12. How can there be insurance in a society of one, when there is no one to pay the insurance premium to?

  • 13. Explain what is meant by "labor intensive" production and how it differs from the alternatives.

  • 14. Explain how investments can exist in a society of one in which there is no money.

  • 15. Explain the principle of rational ignorance.

  • 16. State and explain the equation of satisfaction. Then explain how satisfaction can fall at the same time attainments are increasing.

**********

Footnotes

* A. James Gregor, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. ix.

1. Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, New York: National Library Co., 1903, Vol. 1, p. 64.

2. Ibid. p. 64.

3. Ibid., p. 88.

4. Ibid., pp. 87-88.

5. Ibid., p. 81.

6. If your instructor has not devoted a class session to introducing you methodically to the rational action concept and the A X + Y form of analysis, you should read Appendix A before continuing in this chapter.

7. Defoe, p. 67.

8. Ibid., p. 75.

9. Ibid., p. 145.

10. Ibid., p. 138.

11 . Ibid., p. 144.

12. Ibid., p. 75.

13. Ibid., p. 144.

14. Fritz Machlup, The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.

15. Defoe, pp. 143-145.

16. Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, New York: Vintage, 1965, p. 30.


Chapter 3: People Living Together-- Coexistence and Association

 

Chapter 3: People Living Together-- Coexistence and Association

Chapter Objectives

After reading this chapter you should be able to:

  • 1. Explain the relationships among action, inaction, and communication as these terms are distinguished here.

  • 2. Define an association and state the relationship between association and organization.

  • 3. Understand what is meant by a nonassociation point and what the zero with which we label it refers to.

  • 4. Define sanction and inducement and explain how we can tell whether a particular action is a sanction or a withdrawn inducement.

  • 5. Understand the differences between voluntary, involuntary, and trust associations, and give examples of each.

  • 6. See why specialization produces both opportunities and problems.

  • 7. Understand in what sense we can speak meaningfully of social causation.

  • 8. State abstractly the relationships among value, price, and cost, and translate factual situations into these terms.

  • 9. Explain what is meant by an equilibrium, by an equilibrium price, and by an equilibrium of inducements.

Key Terms

action
nonassociation point
types of power: pen, purse, sword
association
organization
coexistence
price
gemeinschaft
sanction
gesellschaft
types of association: voluntary, involuntary, trust
value
inducement
market-clearing
(equilibrium) price

Learning a new theory is like learning a new language,- one stumbles at first,- constant practice is necessary,- long discussions with others similarly involved are indispensable. When journalists, television commentators, educators, and politicians persist in interpreting the issues of political economy through conventional categories, the task is even more difficult. Then it is like learning a foreign language with no one else to talk to. . . . *

THE MEANING OF COEXISTENCE

Thinking about the isolated individual is useful but can take us only so far. We now turn to the more normal human situation in which many people coexist with each other. To help bridge the gap, we will discuss the society of two created when Robinson Crusoe acquired a companion. The term "coexistence" became popular during the late 1950s. Russian leader Nikita Khrushchev called for the "peaceful coexistence" of the U.S.S.R. and the United States. But as Khrushchev implicitly admitted by qualifying the term with the adjective "peaceful," coexistence can have a more fundamental meaning: whenever many people live in the same area at the same time, they can be said to coexist. Coexistence, then, may or may not be peaceful.

After many years of total isolation, Robinson Crusoe gains a companion whom he calls Friday. The cannibals visit the island for one of their periodic feasts. Friday, a member of another tribe, is brought along to be part of the menu, but Crusoe rescues him. With a second character in the scene, many new possibilities arise. The fact that individuals coexist with other individuals has profound implications.

Communications

Advantages of Communicating. When there is more than one person, communication becomes possible. This possibility is temporarily frustrated for Crusoe and Friday because they do not speak the same language. At first, therefore, they are forced to rely on gestures and sign language, so Crusoe gives high priority to teaching Friday some English.

Why is Crusoe so interested in communicating with Friday? No doubt in part this can be explained by his desire for companionship: "Besides the pleasure of talking to him," says Crusoe, "I had a singular satisfaction in the fellow himself." [Footnote 1] But communicating has many other advantages as well.

Individual decisions about what to do are based not only on information about the current state of affairs but also on experience. Only experience can serve as a basis for deciding what action A will deliver a certain goal X, and what side effect Y can be expected from various actions. The A ---> X + Y formula of the elements of rational action introduced in Chapter 2 and Appendix A, therefore, does not merely bind together considerations of cause and effect and considerations of value. It also integrates the past, present, and future. We decide on present actions to try to get desired future results. But our knowledge of cause and effect relationships upon which current decisions are based necessarily derives from past experience. Communications between Crusoe and Friday enable them to pool their separate experi- ences, thus allowing each to act more effectively to get what he wants.

Distinguishing Between Actions and Words.

Coexistence also makes associations possible. We will turn our attention to these shortly. But since we will be defining associations in terms of actions as distinguished from communications, a few words about this distinction are now in order. We are all familiar with the sayings "Actions speak louder than words," and "Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words can never hurt me." For our purposes the truth of these proverbs, which is dubious, is beside the point. We are concerned with the distinction itself, not the validity of particular propositions in which it appears. In a way, these sayings imply a false dichotomy between communications and actions. All normal human communications employ actions--- deliberate bodily motions. Therefore, the line between words and deeds cannot be drawn very sharply if we merely describe physical events. Not only is there a certain minimum amount of action in all human communications--moving the lips, nodding the head, fingers manipulating typewriter keys--but it is hard to think of any action that could not be used to communicate.

Normally, communication takes place via words or representations of words. We can use "words" loosely to refer to communications in general. But the essential requirement for communication is that mutually understood meanings be attached to particular actions. "Words," then, become motions whose significance lies primarily in symbolic meaning rather than in their natural consequences.

But what if someone assassinates the president in order to communicate unhappiness with administration policies? Does punishing the assassin for murder violate his First Amendment rights to free speech? No court would so hold. To exempt actions producing important natural consequences from legal regulation because they are also communications would produce chaos. Any action may contain a communication. Assassination must therefore be classified as an action, not a symbol of an action--not as words. For this purpose the "sticks and stones" formula may not be a bad test: if the action is one that can "break bones," it has lost its symbolic nature. The relationship between actions and communications can be diagrammed in the form of a "donut" [rendered in square form for Web-version of book]:

 
            ______________________
            |                    |
            |      actions       |               
            |     __________     |
            |     |        |     |  inactions
            |     |  words |     |   (things not done)
            |     |________|     |
            |                    |
            |____________________|

                                   

Any point outside the larger circle represents an inaction, something that somebody might have done but did not. Any point between the two circles stands for an actiona deliberate human motion whose primary significance is not its symbolic meaning. Points inside the smaller circle represent communications- deliberate human motions whose primary significance lies in their symbolic meaning.

In daily life, "action" is often used to refer to any or all of these three meanings. Even in analysis in terms of A ---> X + Y, A can just as well refer to communications or to inactions as it can to actions in the narrower sense. For purposes of our discussion of associations, however, "actions" will refer only to things done, not to words or to inactions.

ASSOCIATIONS

Association is, in addition to communication, the other major factor in the coexistence of several people in the same place. As long as Crusoe remained alone on his island, the only actions that could affect his satisfaction were those he took himself. We have defined satisfaction, in Chapter 2, as the ratio of a person's perceived attainments to his desires:

           S = Ap/D
      

As the elements of the equation suggest, Crusoe can change his own satisfaction in three different ways:

  • 1. By actions that change his attainments

  • 2. By changing his desires

  • 3. By changing his perception of his attainmentsFootnote 2

Satisfaction can be expressed as a point on a one-dimensional scale. Crusoe's satisfaction at a given time, for example, can be represented by point K on the following line:

                                K
   Crusoe's        _____________|______________
  satisfaction  (lower)                   (higher)

Crusoe's actions can have three possible kinds of impact on his own satisfaction. Some actions might leave his satisfaction unchanged at K. A second kind of action might reduce his satisfaction to a level represented by point J.

 
                          <-----
                          J     K
   Crusoe's        _______|_____|_________________
  satisfaction  (lower)                    (higher)
                           

A third kind of action might increase his satisfaction to a level represented by point L:

                                 ----->
                                K      L
   Crusoe's        _____________|______|_____________
 satisfaction   (lower)                     (higher)

Cooperation and Conflict

When additional characters enter the scene, actions producing changed satisfaction no longer have to be taken by the person whose satisfaction is to be changed. Friday's satisfaction can be increased by Crusoe's actions, and Crusoe's by Friday's. Friday's satisfaction is raised considerably by his rescue and by food supplied by Crusoe. Crusoe's satisfaction is increased by Friday's assistance; the latter's first assignment is to bury the remains of the cannibals' other victims, a task for which the squeamish Crusoe has no taste.

In addition to swapping favors, tasks beyond the strength of one person can now be accomplished. Crusoe has long ago given up trying to move his hollowed out tree down to the ocean, and it is completely rotten by the time Friday joins him. But the two men build a similar boat and manage jointly to move it "inch by inch, upon great rollers into the water." Footnote 3

Introducing a second person also opens up less congenial possibilities. One person's actions can reduce as well as increase the other's satisfaction. Crusoe, aware that Friday may be dangerous, produces additional insurance:

I made a little tent for him in the vacant place between my two fortifications, in the inside of the last and in the outside of the first; and as there was a door or entrance there into my cave, I made a formal framed door-case, and a door to it of boards, and set it up in the passage, a little within the entrance; and causing the door to open on the inside, I barred it up in the night, taking in my ladders too; so that Friday could no way come at me in the inside of my innermost wall without making so much noise in getting over, that it must needs waken me . . . . Footnote 4

What Do We Mean by Association?

When Crusoe's satisfaction is being changed by Friday's actions, or Friday's by Crusoe's, we can say that the two men are associated or that they constitute an association. Since one person's actions may or may not affect another's satisfaction, the fact that the two coexist does not automatically mean that they are "associated." Nor does communication between people indicate that they are associated in the sense we will be using that term here. In terms of our earlier "donut" model, communications are not actions, and only actions can create an association.

Now let us imagine that in the context of another person's action your satisfaction level is at point P:

                                 P
   Your            ______________|_______________
  satisfaction  (lower)                    (higher)

Are you thereby associated? Before we can answer this question we must determine whether satisfaction P represents a change for you. Just as your own actions may produce no change in your satisfaction, so too may the actions of other people have no impact upon it. But unless one person's level of satisfaction is changed by another's action, they do not constitute an association as we are defining it.

To ascertain whether an association exists between two people, we must, therefore, have a base-line from which to measure each person's satisfaction. Obviously, this point must be the level of satisfaction each would have if the other person took no actions at all affecting him in ways that he cares about. [Footnote 5] Using Crusoe and Friday as our examples, and assuming that the two are not associated by virtue of any action taken by Crusoe, we can represent Crusoe's satisfaction before Friday acts as point Z.

                              
                              Z     
    Crusoe's       ___________|__________________
   satisfaction (lower)                   (higher)

If Friday's action leaves Crusoe's satisfaction at Z, the two men are not associated. If Friday's action leaves Crusoe's satisfaction at any level other than Z, they are associated:

                               ---->
                              Z     P
   Crusoe's        ___________|_____|____________
  satisfaction  (lower)                   (higher)

                         <----
                         P    Z
   Crusoe's        ______|____|___________________
  satisfaction  (lower)                   (higher)

Point Z represents the level of Crusoe's satisfaction when he is not associated with Friday. We can call it Crusoe's non- association point with regard to Friday, and for simplicity we can label this with a zero:

                                0
  Crusoe's        ______________|________________
 satisfaction  (lower)                    (higher)

Crusoe's non-association point is a "floating" one in terms of the absolute level of his satisfaction that it refers to. His satisfaction can also be changed by his own actions, by the actions of people other than Friday, and by changes in the natural environment. The 0 with which we label this point on the line represents not the total absence of any satisfaction but the absence of an association, and it refers not necessarily to the absence of any association, but to the absence of one with Friday. Since changes in Crusoe's satisfaction resulting from his own actions have no bearing on whether he is associated with Friday, they cannot shift his satisfaction away from his non-association point with regard to Friday. Nor can actions by people other than Friday or changes in the natural environment have any such effect. To summarize:

  • 1. An association exists when one person's satisfaction is increased or decreased by another's action.

  • 2. The increase or decrease in satisfaction is relative to the level that would exist if the other person took no actions at all.

  • 3. Changes in satisfaction due to one's own actions have no bearing on whether one is associated with anybody.

  • 4. Changes in satisfaction due to another person's action have no bearing on whether an association exists with yet another person.

Types of Association

Ways to Classify Associations. In order to determine whether any association exists at all we must establish a zero point. Once we have defined this non-association point an additional opportunity presents itself. Action can change another person's satisfaction either to the right or to the left of the zero point. We can therefore classify both this action and the resulting association in terms of the kind of changed satisfaction involved.

Inducements and Sanctions. The terms we will use to refer to the two kinds of action are "inducement" and "sanction":

  • 1. Inducement is that action that leaves the other person's satisfaction above the zero (or non-association) point vis- a-vis the person taking the action.

  • 2. Sanction is the action that leaves the person's satisfaction below the zero point vis-a-vis the actor.

  Friday's         Sanctions    0   Inducements
 satisfaction     ______________|_________________  
               (lower)                      (higher)

Consent. We will classify association in terms of two characteristics:

    • 1. Whether it is based on sanction or on inducement

    • 2. Whether the person whose satisfaction is changed consents to the other person's action

Consent is a uniquely social phenomenon, involving as it does both action and communication. During Robinson Crusoe's solitary years, the question of consent to action could hardly arise. Once Crusoe had decided what to do he had no occasion to "clear it" with anybody else, for there was nobody else. When another person enters the picture, however, an action that is proposed by one person may be objectionable to the other person, whose satisfaction could be adversely affected. The person desiring to act may take one of two possible attitudes in this social context:

    • 1. He or she may barge ahead unilaterally and take the action in spite of the objections.

    • 2. He or she may refrain from acting except when those who will be affected by the action express their consent. Since we always "consent" to our own actions, we may call this second approach action by mutual consent.

Since all associations result from actions, and these actions can be classified variously as sanctions or inducements, and as unilateral or by mutual consent, we can classify associations in terms of the following table:

    Table 3-1.  Involuntary Associations, Trusts, Voluntary
    Associations

              Sanctions           Inducements

Unilateral  1. Involuntary       2.Trusteeship
               associations        associations

Mutual                           3. Voluntary
 Consent                          associations

Involuntary Associations. An involuntary association is created by the unilateral imposition or the threat of sanctions. They may be extremely gross or highly subtle. A grossly involuntary association exists, for example, when the victim hands over his wallet in response to the robber's threats. This association involves a sanction that will be imposed unless the victim cooperates, and if the victim could have nothing at all to do with the robber he would gladly do so. But there is no such choice, for their relationship has been unilaterally established by the robber.

Air pollution exemplifies a more subtle involuntary association. Here, the sanction is imposed but not threatened, and the polluting companies, for example, have no desire to manipulate the actions of others. They merely want to achieve cheaply what would otherwise be more costly. They dump waste products from their enterprise into the atmosphere. The pollution is a sanction because it reduces attainments of the people who breath the air-their long-term health and longevity and the general attractiveness of environment. If the magnitude of the sanction is great enough to be perceived, then an association is created between the company and the people breathing the air and that association is involuntary.

Trusts. A second type of association, which we will call "trusts," is created by unilaterally conferring inducements. The most familiar example is the association between parents and children in the nuclear family. Children, especially when very young, are in no position to give or to withhold consent to associate with their parents. The association is created unilaterally by the parents, but their actions--creating, housing, feeding, clothing the child--are inducements from the child's point of view.

     Involuntary          Trusts           Voluntary

   I-----------unilateral-----------I  I--mutual consent--I  

   I--sanctions--------I   I------inducements ------------I


             Figure 3-3.  The three types of associations.

Voluntary Associations. Voluntary associations, a third type, are created by the exchange or transfer of inducements or expected inducements by mutual consent. Traditional difficulties fitting the family into general social analysis may derive from its two-dimensionality. Although it is a trust association between the parents (jointly) and their children, it is a voluntary association between husband and wife. Voluntary associations can be far larger than a family. Four of the predominant institutions in modern America-corporations, labor unions, political parties, and churches are basically voluntary associations. The fourth combination of types--sanctions by mutual consent--can exist only when the sanctions are falsely expected to be inducements by the party who consents to them. (Sanctions reduce another person's net satisfaction below what it would be if the actor did nothing at all. Naturally, no one who sees it for what it is would consent to such an action.) Instead of recognizing a fourth type of association--"mistakes"- -we will regard these as a special type of voluntary association. Hence, the definition of voluntary associations is in terms of inducements or expected inducements. This has two advantages: It avoids introducing an additional complexity into our typology of associations. And it makes a person's consent to associate conclusive evidence that he believes a particular action by another person will increase his own satisfaction. We thus avoid problems otherwise posed by the fact that "one person's meat is another's poison."

Rather than arranging the three possible combinations two- dimensionally, we can diagram them along a single dimension, paving the way for further developments in the next chapter (Fig. 3-3).

OTHER ELEMENTS IN COEXISTENCE

The two chief possibilities opened up by coexistence are communications and associations. But communications and associations create additional possibilities, and these too may be regarded as elements in coexistence.

Feelings About Other People

Sometimes human interactions are classified into "I-Thou" and "I-it" relationships, or into Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. The first pair of terms was introduced by Martin Buber, a modern Jewish philosopher, and the second pair by Ferdinand Tonnies, a nineteenth-century German sociologist. Buber's I-Thou, corresponding with Tonnies' Gemeinschaft, is a relationship that people value in itself rather than as a means to some other end. The I-it or Gesellschaft relationship, on the other hand, is one regarded by those involved as a means to other ends.

I-It Interactions. For example, a person getting a haircut normally does not find intrinsic satisfaction in dealing with the barber. Nor does the barber regard his relationship with customers as important in its own right. Rather, the barber performs his services in order to make money, and the customer comes to the barber in order to maintain a desired appearance. The relationship between barber and customer is an I-it or Gesellschaft one.

I-Thou Interactions. On the other hand most people have some contacts that they find inherently worthwhile, with no ulterior purpose. The concepts of "love" and "friendship" apply to these I-Thou or Gemeinschaft relationships, contrasting with the impersonality or acquaintance aspect of the 1-it. Politics is basically a Gesellschaft, as its scale precludes the more intimate atmosphere required for a Gemeinschaft. But most people find more meaning in their small-scale, personalized I- Thou Gemeinschaft relations. Indeed, a Gemeinschaft might almost be defined as the communication of meaning between people. A Gemeinschaft, though normally found in the context of an association, is thus not an association in our sense at all. The association is merely the occasion or packaging.

Specialization

Coexistence also makes specialized production possible. Unlike Crusoe, each individual need not be a jack of all trades. Specialization can produce higher standards of living or reduced hours of work or both.

Efficient production requires knowledge, experience, and skill. Individuals who spread themselves too thin cannot acquire these things. The classic analysis is found in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations published in 1776. Speaking of pin- makers, Smith observes:

A workman not educated to this business . . . could scarce . . . make one pin in a day. . . . But in the way in which this business is now carried on . . . it is divided into a number of branches. . . . One man draws out the wire, another straights it, a third cuts it, a fourth points it, a fifth grinds it at the top for receiving the head; . . . making a pin is . . . divided into about eighteen distinct operations. . . . I have seen a small manufactory . . . where only ten men . . . could make among them about twelve pounds of pins in a day. . forty-eight thousand pins . . . . Footnote 6

Specialized labor, which increases total social production, also creates problems. Ways must be found to determine who is going to specialize in what. As specialization increases, it becomes harder for people to evaluate work performed by other specialists. Highly specialized work can be boring and obnoxious. Smith's pinmakers hardly found their work intellectually challenging. And the vast productivity resulting from specialized labor is useless unless transfers take place. Without transfers, people who grow no food must starve and those producing no clothes go naked. As we will see in due course, sharp conflicts arise over the terms on which these transfers will take place.

Property

Coexistence, as we have said, means that more than one person lives in the same area. When this is the case, each individual can no longer consume natural resources without external restraints. Crusoe limited use of resources only to save some for his own future use. But in a normal society resources used by one person become unavailable for others, and resources are likely to become scarcer as population increases.

John Locke's classic principle that workers have rights to what they produce leaves us with one basic question: Who has the right to "mix labor" (as Locke puts it) with given natural resources? When a resource is plentiful, every individual can take all he can use and there is no problem. Crusoe represents an extreme case of this happy possibility. But as population increases, many resources are not abundant enough. People find themselves in a "zero sum game" where more resources for one person mean less for someone else. People then begin claiming exclusive rights over these resources and often incur considerable costs to defend them. Footnote 7

The easiest way to control natural resources is to claim land where they are located. Individuals may try to defend "their" land by threatening trespassers with sanctions, but traditionally this has been a job for governments. "Property" has always been a fundamental political problem. Complicated land tenure rules were a key to feudal politics. The Communists promised land to the peasants in order to gain power in Russia, then took it back again in the collectivization drive of the 1930s. "Agrarian reform" is always a hot issue in the less developed countries. Two of America's most important laws were the Homestead Act and the Land Grant Colleges Act of the nineteenth century. Two hundred years after the American Revolution, 350 years after Europeans settled in North America, Indians were claiming large portions of Maine, Montana, and the Dakotas in serious lawsuits.

It is clear why property issues are so important. People cannot live without producing, which requires both labor and natural resources. Ability to work is worthless to individuals who cannot gain access to materials with which to "mix" their labor.

SOCIAL POWER AND SOCIAL CAUSATION

Coexistence also implies the possibility of social power, as distinguished from power over physical nature. Examining social power, we encounter basic issues about the nature of social causation, or the relationship between an individual's actions and the actions of other people.

Power

"Power" can be a dangerous term. A dean of the Stanford University Law School once argued that the word should be outlawed. It has so many meanings that it is easy to slip unwittingly and illogically from one to another. [Footnote 8] Nevertheless, "power" is indispensable in thinking about politics. Many philosophers have even identified it as the key political concept. We must therefore steer a middle course, neither abandoning the term nor throwing it around loosely.

Social power can be defined as our ability to get another person to do what we want, when its magnitude is sufficient. We will distinguish three types of social power: the power of the pen, the power of the sword, and the power of the purse.

The Power of the Pen. The power of the pen grows out of our ability to say and to refrain from saying things. Of course "pen" is only a convenient metaphor. Under modern conditions it includes the power of the typewriter, the microphone, and the camera.

We can employ pen-power overtly to persuade others to do what we want. We may try to convince them that they will like the consequences of the action we have prescribed or to convince them to change their values so that consequences already expected will be acceptable.

The power of the pen can also be used covertly, although the exact boundary between overt persuasion and covert manipulation is unclear. Manipulation clearly includes cases in which the power of the pen is employed negatively. For example, if we delay sending a message to someone until it will be too late for him to react in a way we disfavor, that is manipulation rather than persuasion.

The power of the pen is vitally important in politics. It is not always true that the pen is mightier than the sword, but this old saying still has some validity. The power of the sword may prevail in the short run, but decisions about using it are based on ideas which have been propagated by the pen.

The Power of the Sword. The sword is a metaphor for the power that comes from our ability to do things that another person does not like. The actions that constitute the power of the sword are sanctions. Other symbolic expressions for sanctions include the gun and the stick. The gun suggests the hold-up man encountering victim and growling, "Your money or your life!" If the victim hands over his money--an action desired by the robber- -the robber, if he is an "honest crook" who keeps his implied word, refrains from exercising his ability to blow the victim's brains out. The stick evokes a scenario in which an obstinate donkey--or elephant: let us be non-partisan!--moves forward to escape the blows of the club urging it onward.

The power of the sword is the power to destroy. It may destroy life, liberty, comfort, or property. In any event, the sword destroys the other person's option of having nothing to do with the person wielding it.

Even so, the power of the sword is not unlimited. The wholesale sanctions known as hydrogen bombs were not technically possible as recently as World War II And even the hydrogen bomb is not all-powerful, as the United States discovered during World War III: atomic weapons were not useful in Vietnam. A steamshovel is a powerful machine, but useless for swatting a mosquito. Yet that tiny mosquito can give you malaria. While Mao Tse-tung may have exaggerated when he said that the atomic bomb is a "paper tiger," he still touched upon an important truth.

The Power of the Purse. The power of the purse comes from our ability to refrain from doing something that another person would like us to do. Actions constituting the power of the purse are inducements. We can make an action that the other person wants contingent upon his acting as we want.

While "purse" makes an excellent metaphor, we should not think of this power merely in terms of money. Indeed, the power of the purse exists where there is no money. In concentration camps, whose inmates have no money, the power of the purse still exists; thing is bartered for thing, and favors are exchanged. Another term used to convey this meaning is the "carrot," in which our donkey is attracted forward by a carrot it would like to eat.

             

Table 3-2. Types of Power

Metaphor            Pen            Sword          Purse
Other terms         typewriter     gun            dollar
                    microphone     stick          carrot
Nature of thing
 done or not done  communication   destructive    productive
                                    action          action
Name of the 
communication or
action             pure persuasion sanctions      inducements
                   manipulation
                      
Example            seduction       rape           prostitution
                      
Definition         Power based     Power based    Power based
                   on our ability  on our ability on our ability
                   to say things   to do some-    to refrain
                   and to re-      thing that     from doing
                   frain from      another per-   something
                   saying          son does       that another
                   things.         not like.      person would like.

Inducements grow out of production. If we can produce something--a carrot, a carriage, or a crowbar--desired by others, we have power. Others may be willing to do something we want if we will give them something we have made. Our production may increase the other person's options by giving him the possibility of trading with us. Of course, if we use the crowbar we have produced to beat up somebody unless he does what we want, we employ the power of the sword rather than the purse. Swords, like all other goods, must be produced before they can be used, but the mere fact that they were once produced does not make their use an inducement. Table 3-2 summarizes the three kinds of social power. In addition to the explanation already presented, the table gives an example of each kind of power drawn from the same arena. How Social Power Is Limited The distinction between communication and action establishes the boundary between the power of the pen, on the one hand, and the powers of sword and purse. The pen is the power of words and silences. Purse and sword are powers of action and, in a certain sense, inaction. We should not be confused by the fact that words are involved in the employment of sword and purse. Offers or threats are not an exercise of power by means of the pen, but a communication of the intention to act in a certain way unless the listener cooperates. The power thus wielded is the power of action, not that of the word. How the Three Powers Are Kept Separated. The boundary between the powers of purse and sword is defined by the non-association or zero point separating inducements from sanctions. It is important to understand that the direction in which one person's satisfaction is changed by another's action does not, by itself, determine whether that action is a sanction or an inducement. An action reducing another person's satisfaction may be either a sanction or an inducement. Likewise, an action that increases another's satisfaction may be either a sanction or an inducement. In order to classify the action we must examine its context: an increase or decrease in satisfaction compared to what? In this case, the "what" is the non-association or zero point as defined above. Lest it seem that we are making too much fuss over a rather technical question, consider the analogous question of measuring temperatures. Ten minutes ago the temperature in our room was 50 degrees. Now it is 20 degrees. Which have we probably been running, the furnace or the air conditioner? Does it make any difference that the first temperature was 50 degrees Fahrenheit and the second was 20 degrees Centigrade? (The Centigrade zero point--0 degrees--corresponds to 32 degrees Fahrenheit, the freezing point of water at sea level.) In order to determine what has really happened here we must either convert the 20 degrees Centigrade to 68 degrees Fahrenheit or convert the 50 degrees Fahrenheit to 10 degrees Centigrade. Having made either of these conversions we can easily see that the room's temperature has increased from 50 to 68 Fahrenheit, or from 10 to 20 Centigrade. Imagine what foolish conclusions we could draw about the effects of furnaces or air conditioners if we indiscriminately used both of these scales without being aware of their different zero points! Now imagine what foolish conclusions we can draw about human associations if we indiscriminately shift the boundary between sanctions and inducements to suit our fancy of the moment. The non- association or zero point is not an unimportant technicality; it is fundamental to any systematic political analysis.

Which kind of power, for example, is used by an employer who reduces, or threatens to reduce, his worker's salary? Or a robber who hands back his victim's wallet leaving him his papers and carfare? It might seem that the employer who reduces a salary is imposing a sanction, because the worker does not like this and it reduces his satisfaction. And since the victim does like receiving back his wallet, papers, and part of his money, the robber's action might appear to be an inducement. But both of these conclusions would be incorrect. They do not properly take into account the context in which these specific actions take place.

Before he is hired, the worker's satisfaction is at his nonassociation point with this particular employer. If he accepts the offer of a job at $20,000 a year, the inducements conferred by the employer increase his satisfaction up to point P:

                                   -------------->
                                  0               P (20,000/year)
  worker's        ________________|_______________|___________
 satisfaction  (lower) Sanctions    Inducements       (higher)

If the employer subsequently reduces his salary to $16,000 a year, this must be represented in the diagram by a reduction in the worker's satisfaction from P to Q:

                                             <-----                                    
                                   0         Q     P
 worker's         _________________|_________|_____|___________
 satisfaction  (lower)   Sanctions  Inducements         (higher)

Seen in this context, reducing the salary is clearly a reduced or negative inducement, not a sanction. Q is still above the non-association point. The association between worker and employer thus is still a voluntary one.

The converse reasoning applies in the case of the "generous" robber. Before the robbery, the victim's satisfaction is at his non-association point with regard to the robber. The robber threatens to kill him, a prospect which the victim regards as a sharp decrease in his attainments and, thus, satisfaction is reduced to point G:

                           <-----
                           G      0
  victim's        _________|______|_______________________
  satisfaction (lower) Sanctions    Inducements    (higher)

The victim prefers to hand over his wallet because the reduction in his satisfaction to point E resulting from this action is less than that expected if he resists. Functionally, this forking over is the equivalent of allowing the robber to remove the wallet from one's pocket. When the robber refrains from killing his victim this is not an inducement, but a withdrawn sanction. Likewise, if the robber returns the wallet and part of the money, leaving the victim's satisfaction at point H, this is an additional withdrawn sanction.

       

                      ---> -->
                      G   E  H    0
  victim's         ___|___|__|____|________________________
 satisfaction  (lower) Sanctions    Inducements     (higher)

The association remains involuntary, because the victim's net satisfaction is reduced to less than it would have been if he had had nothing to do with the robber at all.

Distinction between Type and Magnitude of Power. We must avoid confusing types of power with the separate issue of magnitude. There should be no presumption that all sanctions are more important or more powerful than all inducements. A sanction such as a $3 fine for jaywalking may affect the satisfaction of the person on whom it is imposed or threatened very little. And a very large impact may be produced by a withdrawn inducement. Most people would far rather pay the $3 fine than to be fired from their $500,000 a year job as president of General Motors or to be removed from the U.S. presidency by impeachment proceedings. Yet these latter events constitute withdrawn inducements rather than sanctions.

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL CAUSATION

In dealing with nature we need not distinguish between power and causation. Power over non-human matter is simply the ability to cause something to happen. If we have the power to move enough electrons through a tungsten wire suspended in a vacuum, we can cause its temperature to rise to the level at which light is emitted. Human interactions are different. In the social sense, power is our ability to get another to act as we desire. But we need not assume that such actions are caused by the person who wields power.

Imagine a deranged worker who hires somebody to murder his employer. The worker uses his purse to induce the assassin to employ the sword. The hireling shoots the offending boss twice, killing him instantly. The death is caused (in the physical sense) by two bullets destroying essential body tissue. The bullets are made to attain high velocities by the explosive ignition of gunpowder. The gunpowder is made to ignite by the gun's firing mechanism. The mechanism's motion is caused by that of the gunman's trigger finger. The finger was made to move by the gunman, and we call this deliberate movement his action.

But in what sense, if any, can we say that the gunman's action was caused by anything? Although we can say that the action was caused by the gunman, this adds nothing to what we already knew. Any effort to go further and say that the gunman was caused to take the action by somebody else does not just repeat what we already knew; it adds something that is patently absurd. The worker who hired the murderer may be thousands of miles from the scene of the crime. Deciding whether to commit this murder is entirely up to the gunman. Agreements need not be carried out; the courts are full of people suing for breech of contract. (Needless to say, no court would enforce an agreement to do something illegal.) Common sense is therefore violated if we say that one person has caused another's action.

Causing Action vs. Causing the Possibility of an Action

Disturbing philosophical implications are raised by any claim that one person's action was caused by somebody else. It implies that human beings are not responsible for their own actions and that there is no free will. It dismisses as an immense illusion our personal experience of making choices about what to do.

We need not come to such drastic conclusions at all. It is quite possible to account for our experience with social power and social causation without coming into conflict with individual choice and "free will." Social causation is the causation of possibilities and impossibilities rather than of actions. A drawbridge operator who lowers the bridge into position makes it possible for us to cross that bridge. But lowering the bridge does not cause us to cross it, and indeed we may choose not to do so. If we do drive across the bridge, this actualizes the possibility, but the action, as distinguished from its possibility, is not caused by the bridge operator.

What Social Power Really Does. Each kind of social power causes possibilities and impossibilities. The pen, for example, creates a possibility when you write a job application letter. By announcing your existence and qualifications, you make it possible for the employer to consider you. If competition is keen, your chances of actually getting the job may be small, but they would have been smaller if you had not applied. "Knock and it shall be opened to you" may put the case too optimistically for secular purposes, but we can be pretty sure the door will not open if we do not knock.

The power of the pen can also create impossibilities. When a junior bureaucrat suppresses key facts that have come to his attention, he may make it impossible for his superiors to learn these facts. Consequently, they may make different decisions than they otherwise would. If Albert Einstein had not told President Franklin Roosevelt about the possibility of atomic bombs early in World War 1I this would have been a negative exercise of the pen. Silences are normally undramatic--this one, however, might have meant no Manhattan Project, no atomic bomb, and a vastly different world.

The sword, too, creates possibilities and impossibilities. Literally, it can make it impossible for some people to take any actions at all, or to say anything. Dead men tell no tales! Conversely, one person's impossibilities are another's opportunity. Lee Harvey Oswald made it impossible for President Kennedy to continue to act, thus making it possible for Lyndon Johnson to do things that were impossible while he remained vice president.

Threatened sanctions make it impossible for someone to act as he otherwise would without suffering artifically attached side effects. Action is not made impossible, but impossible without repercussions. Laws against murder do not make murders impossible, but they may create circumstances where fewer murders happen.

Inducements--the power of the purse--cause various kinds of possibilities and impossibilities. A person offered an inducement enjoys an additional possibility. If somebody offers $2000 for your car, you can choose between having the car but not the $2000, or the $2000 but not the car. If you accept this offer you cannot sell your car to anybody else. Cooperation induced by the purse makes achievements far beyond the reach of any individual possible.

ASSOCIATIONS AND EQUILIBRIUM

Price, Cost, and Value

Price. In terms of association theory, a "price" is any action or inaction by a person that reduces his own satisfaction but increases that of another. For example, few people would clean sewers or preside over a blast furnace or prepare other people's income tax returns for the sheer joy of it. Each of these activities probably reduces the satisfaction of the person engaged in them. Yet people do in fact come forward to do these and many other unpleasant jobs. The worker's satisfaction is increased more by the salary paid by his employer than it is reduced by performing the tasks.

"Price" applies to involuntary associations as well as voluntary ones. When the victim hands over his wallet to the robber, his action is a price; it reduces his satisfaction to less than it would have been without any contact with the robber at all. But he hopes the robber will respond by refraining from any action that would reduce his satisfaction still farther.

In common usage, "price" is ambiguous. It may refer either to the asking price or to that at which the deal is actually made-the exchange price. Normally, the exchange price will be less than or equal to the asking price. For example, the sticker (asking) price on a new car may be $6000, but it may actually sell for $5200 after some hard bargaining. Unless we modify the term with the adjective "asking," we will use "price" here to refer solely to exchange price. The price of the new car, thus, is $5200.

Cost. Confusion may occur among the concepts of price, cost, and value. Cost is what a person has to give up in order to get something else that he wants. But costs need not involve giving something up to another person. As we saw in Chapter 2, even a Crusoe has "opportunity costs"; that is, materials used for one purpose become unavailable for others and time used doing one thing cannot be used to do something else. Costs may be seen as the side effects, Y in the A ---> X + Y formula, or they may be seen as actions taken or foregone.

Price is a subset or particular type of cost. It is a cost in a social context, an action which increases another's satisfaction as well as reducing that of the person taking it.

Value. Value represents what a person would be willing to do or give up, if necessary, in order to achieve some desired goal. For example, a person may value a certain new car so much that he would be willing to pay $5500 if he had to in order to obtain it. Naturally, however, he would rather pay less and certainly will if he has the opportunity.

The "Market"

Robert Nozick comments on the implications of analyses along the lines above for students of politics:

From no association will I be able to get something worth more to them than what I contribute is worth to them. Need I accept less . . . ? If one association offers me less than they would gain from my presence, it will be to the advantage of another association that values my presence equally to offer me something more. . . . Similarly for a third association with regard to the second. . . . We seem to have a realization of the economists' model of a competitive market. This . . . gives us immediate access to a powerful, elaborate, and sophisticated body of theory and analysis. Footnote 9

Since price is a concept applying to voluntary associations, says Nozick, the entire accumulated wisdom of what is called microeconomics is directly applicable to voluntary associations. Microeconomics is the study of the behavior of particular consumers and producers in terms of costs, prices, supply, and demand.

Equilibrium in the Market. A key concept in microeconomics is that of a market-clearing or equilibrium price. This is the price or ratio at which exchanges by mutual consent tend to take place. This equilibrium price is defined in terms of "demand" and "supply" for particular things. In our terms, demand is the amount of some product that people are willing and able to buy at a given price. For example, at a price of $100, people in a given area may be willing and able to purchase 1000 TV sets per year. Supply is the amount of something that people are willing and able to produce at a given price. Again, for example, people may be willing and able to produce 500 TV sets per year if the price they can get for them is $100.

As the table indicates, with a price of $100 there will be a shortage of TV sets under the circumstances we have imagined. 500 will be produced but 1000 could have been sold at that price. As long as all parties are free to refuse to deal whenever they prefer, the producers will naturally tend to raise their prices. As the price of a TV set goes up to $150, however, there are two interesting side effects. First, the demand for TV sets will decline. Some people will no longer be willing to buy one; they do not value the TV sets at $150. Others will no longer be able to buy because they do not have the $150 or their other requirements are more pressing. Second, the supply of TV sets will increase. As the price that can be gotten for TV sets increases, the number of sets people will be willing and able to produce at that price will increase.

As the prevailing price rises, supply increases and demand decreases. At some point, they must meet. The price at which supply equals demand is called the market- clearing or equilibrium price.

An equilibrium is a "state of rest due to the action of forces that counteract each other" according to The American College Dictionary. Ring magnets, for example, may be placed around a rod in the orientation in which they appear to repel each other. If the rod is vertical, the magnets will assume a stable equilibrium distance from each other at the point where the repulsive magnetic motions are equal to the gravitational motions of the magnets towards the earth, which tend to bring them together. If the distance between the magnets is decreased by pushing down on the top magnet, they will move outward to their original distance as soon as the extra

              

  Table 3-3.  Equilibrium Price


                                                   Tendency of
  Price/unit        Supply    Demand    Results       Price
  ______________________________________________________________
    $250          1000 units  650 units Surplus      Down
    $200           750 units  750 units Equilibrium  Oscillation
    $150           700 units  850 units Shortage     Up
    $100           500 units 1000 units Large        Up
                                         shortage    
  ______________________________________________________________

pressure is released. On the other hand if the distance between the magnets is increased by giving the top one an additional lift, they move inward to their original distance as soon as the extra lift is ended.

A disturbed equilibrium thus tends to move back into balance from either direction, and can be thought of as a tendency to move toward a central point from both directions. This is exactly the case with an equilibrium price. The shortages produced by a prevailing price below that at which the market is cleared encourage producers to raise prices and buyers to bid prices higher. The surplus produced by a prevailing price above the market-clearing one encourages buyers to shop around and sellers to underbid each other to try to get the available business. Markets, arenas in which everybody is free to deal at mutually agreed upon prices or not to deal at all, are therefore powerful instruments for coordinating the decisions of millions of independent actors.

ORGANIZATION

An organization is an association whose individual parties occupy continuing roles that exist independently of their immediate occupants. Thus all organizations are associations but not all associations are organizations. Sometimes our terminology reflects the difference between the role (or "office") and the person occupying it. The difference between presidency and president is obvious.

Organization and Association

The employment relationship by which individuals enter, occupy, and leave an office is the key to existence of the organization as a special kind of association. Many voluntary associations, particularly the smaller ones, exist only as long as particular individuals participate. The association between husband and wife, for example, lasts at best only until the death of one of the members. The surviving spouse, or both in the event of a divorce, may remarry, but that constitutes a different association, not the same one previously existing. Likewise, a partnership is legally dissolved when any partner dies or withdraws. If the remaining partners wish to continue, they must form a new partnership. This is one reason why large partnerships are rare; incorporation can provide for more stability and simplicity for participants over the long haul.

How Organizations Survive

Essentially, an organization exists independently of decisions by particular parties whether to continue their association with it. Of course, if enough individuals decide to withdraw or not to participate, the organization will die. Organizations are not inherently immortal, but they can exist for vastly longer periods than any individual member. The Catholic Church, thus, is nearly 2000 years old; Harvard University is over 300; the United States government almost 200.

In order for an organization to survive, its leaders must maintain an "equilibrium of incentives" [Footnote 10] for people to participate in it. If the organization is a voluntary association, we can speak more narrowly of an equilibrium of inducements.

Consider, for example, a private college. Parties to this association include students, faculty, administrators, cooks, groundskeepers, trustees, alumni, parents, and benefactors. The students are induced to participate by classes, degrees, and the possibility of learning things they want to learn. In return, they pay tuition and agree to abide by certain rules. The benefactors want to promote certain ideals or developments; in return for their contributions, they derive prestige and a sense of helping to accomplish something important. Faculty are induced to teach by salaries-paid out of the tuition and gifts received by the college-as well as by the intrinsic satisfactions of teaching. As long as college leaders can use the limited resources contributed by various participants to induce the others to keep on participating, an equilibrium of inducements exists.

If, however, the college is unable to pay good faculty members enough, they may start leaving. The quality of instruction may then decline, reducing student willingness to continue paying tuition and further reducing the inducements available to retain faculty. Unless a new equilibrium can be established, the organization will disappear. As long as the equilibrium of inducements is maintained, however, the college's existence does not depend on a continued association with any particular individual. This does not render the association with each individual member involuntary, though, for each is free to end his association, his membership in the organization, if he prefers. In this sense, decisions made by leaders on behalf of organizations can be "binding" on the organization but not binding on individual members if they prefer to leave rather than comply.

The Organization Leader. In economic terms, an organization's leader is an entrepreneur. His function is to bring together the different elements of the organization, to lead and coordinate their various activities, and to arrange the total picture so that an equilibrium of inducements is achieved. Since each individual member is free to leave if he can secure a better deal--more inducements or a lower price--elsewhere, the entrepreneur's task is not an easy one, and he cannot afford to rest on his laurels in a dynamic environment.

Governments, of course, are organizations, often the biggest and invariably the most powerful in their country. Presidents may retire, die, or be assassinated. New civil servants and military personnel replace old ones in a steady turnover. Individual congressmen and judges leave their offices, but they do not leave them empty. The individuals filling government offices are always changing, but the offices themselves continue to exist. Governments thus are organizations as we have defined them here, often the biggest and most powerful organizations in their country. Governments are thus a subset of a subset (see Figure 3-6).

         Figure 3-6.  Associations, organizations, and
                       governments.  
         ____________________________________________
         |                                          |
         |   _____________________                  |
         |   |                   |  Associations    |
         |   |  Organizations    |                  |
         |   |   ________        |                  | 
         |   |   |      |        |                  | 
         |   |   | Govt.|        |                  |
         |   |   |______|        |                  |
         |   |___________________|                  |
         |__________________________________________| 

SUMMARY

When many people coexist, associations become possible. An association exists when one person's satisfaction is changed by another person's actions. Depending on whether the net satisfaction increases or decreases and upon other factors, an association may be voluntary, a trust, or involuntary. Voluntary associations and trusts pertain only to inducements, or the power of the purse, while sanctions-the power of the sword-are found only in involuntary associations.

Coexistence also permits communications, specialization in different types of production, and conflicts over the right to use scarce natural resources. Specialization has advantages, but these can be achieved only by transferring goods from specialized producers to unspecialized consumers. When this is done through voluntary associations, negotiations about proposed terms of exchange--"prices"--are especially important forms of communication. The "market-clearing" or "equilibrium" price is a key concept in thinking about voluntary associations. Since "price" refers not just to money but to all of the terms of an exchange, basic macroeconomic concepts are directly applicable to analysis of voluntary associations.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

    • 1. News story:

The White House is sending out 40,000 Christmas cards "to friends-it's nice to have that many," Mrs. Nixon said. (Toledo Blade, December 7, 1969)

Discuss the implications here of the distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Is it possible to have 40,000 "friends"?

    • 2. Classified ad:

YOUNG WIDOW SEEKS HUSBAND. Charming 32-year-old widow with four children seeks husband, who is perhaps at the present time also widowed and with young children, in order to rebuild her life with him. She is gracious, intelligent, home-loving, highly moral, well educated and has traveled extensively. Speaks three languages fluently. Excellent cook and polished entertainer. First rate social background. Financially comfortable. The right party must have an irreproachable character and background and will be thoroughly checked out at the proper time. Absolute seriousness offered and demanded. Write NR Box 1354. (National Review, April 20, 1971)
Does this advertisement seem strange to you? Why or why not?

    • 3. Earlier, we noted that insurance has a place even in a society of one. What are the differences, if any, between: (a) insurance and gambling? (b) insurance and a protection racket?

    • 4. What benefits and problems are created when people specialize in producing different kinds of things?

    • 5. A teacher was quoted in the Boston Globe (April 4, 1971):

"Schools serve the economic system. Many of these kids will go into meaningless jobs. . . ."

What is a meaningless job? Is it one which is useless? Why would anybody hire someone to do things which are useless? Does working at a "meaningless" job mean that one's life is meaningless? What are you assuming here in order to answer this question?

    • 6. Marx and Engels, in The Communist Manifesto, complained that:

[Tlhe proletariat, the modern working class, developed-a class of laborers who live only so long as they find work. . . . These laborers . . . are a commodity, like every article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all of the fluctuations of the market.

Although "vicissitudes" generally is defined to mean "changes" or "alternations," it clearly has a negative connotation here, and Webster's Third International Dictionary indicates that it is a synonym for "difficulties." But does the market exert only downward pressure on wages? Is there any reason to think that equilibrium wages, like all other equilibrium prices, result from a balance among factors tending to push them both down and up? According to Table 3- 3, what would be the side effects of trying to force wage levels above the market-clearing price for labor?

    • 7. Explain how we can speak of "social causation" while denying that one person's actions are caused by another's.

    • 8. Compare the definition of "voluntary associations" employed in this text with the following two statements:

When an organization can be shown to be involuntary in some significant sense--perhaps that the choice to leave it is not truly costless for the individual--does government have an obligation to require that the political system of the organization be structured democratically? (Charles Anderson, Statecraft [N.Y., 1977], p. 300.)

In order to facilitate comparability with the bulk of the work in the field, we adopted the definition of voluntary associations as "organizations that people belong to part time and without pay, such as clubs, lodges, good-works agencies and the like" which appears in Berelson and Steiner's widely known inventory of social science findings. . . . (Constance Smith and Anne Freedman, Voluntary Associations.- Perspectives on the Literature [Cambridge, 1972], p. viii.)

    • 9. Anshen and Wormuth note that:

The federal government sometimes intervened with troops to break strikes, as in 1877, 1892, and 1894. (p. 498.)
What does it mean to "strike"? Do you suppose "breaking" a strike refers to forcing strikers to work, or to forcing strikers to refrain from preventing people who want to work from doing so?



***********

Footnotes

* Michael H. Best and William E. Connolly, The Politicized Economy (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1976), P. xiv.

1. Defoe, p. 240.

2. Anticipating Chapter 17, let it be noted that we can regard this changed perception as the action of the perceiving person himself Even though it may have been made possible by the actions or communications of others, it was not made inevitable. We need not pay attention to others' deeds or words. Koestler tells of experiments in which a "cat's auditory nerve was tapped and wired to an amplifier, so that impulses passing from ear to brain were directly recorded. The impulses were caused by the clicking of a metronome. But the moment a mouse in a glass jar was shown to the cat the firings in the auditory nerve were diminished or ceased altogether. The cat was turning a 'deaf ear' on the metronome." (Arthur Koestler, The Act of Creation, New York: Dell, 1964, pp. 513-514.)

3. Defoe, p. 256.

4. Ibid., pp. 234-235.

5. Measuring from the wrong point can throw investigators into immense confusion. Aristotelian mechanics, for example, asked why the arrow keeps moving after it is no longer pushed by the bowstring. The answers were often hilarious. For Newtonian mechanics with its concept of inertia, the question became why the arrow did not continue moving forever, which was explicable in terms of friction and gravitational motion. Newtonians used the arrow's current rather than its former velocity as the zero point from which deviations must be explained. Measuring from the right point is even more crucial for legal philosophers and political scientists. As to the associational zero point, once we realize the necessity of defining it the battle is over. Compare Robert Nozick: "If I buy a good or service from you, I benefit from your activity; I am better off due to it, better off than if your activity wasn't done or you didn't exist at all. . . . Whereas if I pay you for not harming me, I gain nothing from you that I wouldn't possess if either you didn't exist at all or existed without having anything to do with me. ... Roughly, productive activities are those that make purchasers better off than if the seller had nothing at all to do with them." (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, p. 84.) See also Charles Anderson: "A good question that can be asked about any public problem is, How would things work out if no action were taken at all? ... [Ili provides a useful standard against which to measure desirable public intervention, if any is required at all." (Statecraft.- An Introduction to Political Choice and Judgment, New York: Wiley, 1977, p. 57.)

6. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Baltimore: Penguin, 1970, pp. 109-1 10.

7. See Garrett Hardin and John Baden (eds.), Managing the Commons, San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & Co., 1977.

8. Bayless Manning, "Corporate Power and Individual Freedom: Some General Analysis and Particular Reservations," 55 Northwestern University Law Review 38 (1960), p. 44.

9. Nozick, pp. 301-302.

10. See Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of The Executive, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938, pp. 56-59.